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I.

INTRODUCTION
Like most issues of public policy in an interdependent political economy,
the control of health hazards in the workplace is economically, politically,
and ethically complex. Economic markets are characterized by externalities,
barriers to mobility, and transaction costs. The political process is marked
by a diversity of interests, constituencies, and jurisdictions. Ethical considerations require the reconciliation of conflicting rights, duties, and values, and
a confrontation of the political and economic effects of unequal endowments.
And economic, political, and ethical decision-making is further hobbled by
uncertainties about individual and social preferences, and by the fluidity of
those preferences.
These economic, political, and ethical complexities and uncertainties,
moreover, are exacerbated by fundamental difficulties in establishing the

scientific "facts" about health hazards. The highly complex interactive effects
of numerous factors in biological and ecological systems, and the methodological difficulties of investigating and predicting low-probability events raise
barriers to lay access to relevant information and generate uncertainty and

controversy within the scientific community itself. The lack of a comprehensible and established base of scientific fact further disables economic markets,
reduces the ground available for political consensus, and weakens the possibility of informed choice.
If decisions are nonetheless to be made, decision-makers require some
organizing framework to structure complexity and reduce areas of uncertainty. A variety of frameworks can be drawn upon, depending upon whether
one is concerned largely with the economic, political, ethical, or indeed
scientific dimensions of the problem. Whichever framework is chosen is likely
to derive more or less heavily from one of two competing decision-making
paradigms, which might be termed "analytic" and "cybernetic".' Each of
these paradigms seeks, in different ways, to organize problems so as to limit
the necessity for the exercise of discretion and judgment; and each entails
somewhat different modes for the resolution of conflict within this delimited

1 Numerous attempts have been made to capture this distinction, from Lindblom's
original distinction between "synoptic" and "disjointed incremental" decision-making,
through distinctions between "rational" and (implicitly) non-rational approaches, to
Lindblom's latest distinction between "synoptic" and "strategic" decision-making and
Wildavsky's contrasting of "cogitation and interaction". See Lindblom, The Science of
Muddling Through (1959), 19 Pub. Ad. 79; Politics and Markets (New York: Basic,
1977) at 314ff; Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1972); Dror, Public Policymaking Re-examined (Pennsylvania: Chandler, 1968);
Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power; The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1979). None of these labels captures the distinction I wish to make, since
each of the two paradigms sketched here can be seen in its own terms as rational,
strategic, and even interactive. The analytic-cybernetic distinction is found in Steinbruner, A Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1974), although Steinbruner himself prefers to use the label "cognitive" for the paradigm which
incorporates a cybernetic processing of information within the structure of a belief
system. See also Beer, The Rrain of the Firm (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press,
1972); Schick, "Toward the Cybernetic State," in Waldo, ed., Public Administration in a
Time of Turbulence (New York: Chandler, 1971) at 214.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 20, No.3

area. Within the analytic paradigm it is assumed that complexity and uncertainty can best be dealt with through the comprehensive organization of
information: by arraying all relevant and available data and preferences for
consideration. Within the cybernetic paradigm, on the other hand, it is assumed that complexity and uncertainty can be dealt with only through selective attention to information: by attending only to certain critical variables
which are to be kept within an acceptable range, or to certain sources of
information-as identified by an integrated belief system.
II. ANALYTIC AND CYBERNETIC DECISION-MAKING
Within the analytic paradigm, policy-making is seen as a process that
proceeds by explicitly comparing the probable costs and benefits (measured,
with varying degrees of quantitative precision, in terms of all relevant values)
of a range of alternative policies, and choosing the alternative with the greatest expected net benefit. It operates on the basis of a causal "blueprint" of
the environment and provides for the on-going collection and processing of
information to improve that blueprint. 2 Where different centres of decisionmaking are involved, it is assumed that each will engage in a partisan analysis
and that these analyses, while similar in form, will produce different preferred
outcomes depending upon the values of the participants and the information
available to them. 8 The over-all resolution of differences, then, will involve
negotiations over value trade-offs and attempts to demonstrate the validity
of disputed information. Although most analytic theorists concede that
control over political and economic resources enhances both the power of
participants to bargain for favourable value trade-offs and the ability of
participants to develop a persuasive and informed analysis, the rules of the
game in this model are clearly those of rational calculation.
Within the cybernetic paradigm, on the other hand, much adaptive
problem-solving behaviour occurs without such deliberate and explicit calculation. Indeed, most cybernetic theorists would maintain that, for many
complex problems, attempts to estimate probable outcomes of a wide range
of policy alternatives, and to calculate explicit trade-offs acrosq a range of
objectively incommensurable values will either stall the process in the calculation mode, dissipate its energy in conflict over values, or lead to erroneous4
choices the magnitude of whose effects makes them difficult to correct.
Adaptive behaviour, in the cybernetic model, consists rather in the monitoring of a limited number of critical variables and the adoption of a limited
repertoire of responses in sequence as necessary to maintain each of these
variables within an acceptable range as indicated by feedback from the environment. No explicit prediction of outcomes, no marginal trade-offs of values
are made in this model. Value conflicts are handled, not by maximizing a
2 "The Architecture of Complexity," in Simon, The Science of the Artificial (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969) at 193.
3 Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968).
4 See, e.g., the discussion of "The Law of Large Solutions" in Wildavsky, supra
note 1, at 63-67.
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utility function, but by pursuing different values seriatim or by redefining
the problem so as to deny the existence of value conflicts.
The separate pursuit of conflicting values occurs in part through a process whereby the problem is decomposed into relatively simple sub-problems
that must be hierarchically re-integrated. "Standard operating procedures"
characterize the lower levels of these cybernetic hierarchies, and "sequential
attention to goals" the upper levels. 5 On this basis, the problem-solving process operates on the basis of a "recipe",0 rather than a "blueprint", and
provides for learning on a trial-and-error basis what works but not why it
works.
The resolution of conflicting values without making explicit marginal
trade-offs can also occur, within the cybernetic paradigm, because structure is
imposed on complex problems not by analysis but by cognitive inference. The
cognitive principles of reinforcement (and the weight of information in memory), of the seeking of consistency and stability in perception, and of social
concurrence shape the development of the belief systems within which new
information is interpreted. But these belief systems themselves are subject to
change, at a number of levels, with persistent changes in the shaping influences or in incoming information. Persistent value conflicts, then, will lead
not to explicit marginal trade-offs but to adjustments
to the belief system-or
7
a cessation to consider one or more values.
It will be the burden of this paper to show that, given the particular
types of complexity and uncertainty that characterize problems of occupational health hazards (and particularly the scientific complications), neither
analytic nor cybernetic strategies can be relied upon exclusively. In any public policy response to these problems, both approaches will exist in tension.
The task in the policy arena, then, is to shape a pattern of response in which
these tensions enhance, rather than frustrate, a capacity to resolve complexity
and uncertainty. And the appropriate mix of analytic and cybernetic strategies
will vary according to the degree and type of complexity and uncertainty in
particular policy arenas. Let us consider more closely the dimensions of the
problem in the occupational health arena.
A.

Scientific Complexity and Uncertainty

The distinctive contribution of science to decision-making about control
of occupational health hazards is, potentially, an assessment of the magnitude
of the risk entailed. In the health hazard arena, however, such risk assessment
is highly complicated. The complex etiology of many of the disease outcomes
(often various forms of cancer) is imperfectly understood. Various contending
biopathological models generate different hypotheses to be tested, and different
interpretations of test results. Moreover, experimental and statistical method-

5 Cyert and March, A Behavioural Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963) at ch. 6.
0
Simon, supra note 2.
7 Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1957).
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ologies for hypothesis testing must themselves contend with problems of
limited data. Because so much of the scientific debate surrounding health
hazards surrounds questions of carcinogenicity, a brief tracing out of the
cancer controversy will serve to illustrate some of the scientific issues involved
in this arena.
One of the basic issues relates to the appropriate models of carcinogenesis. Although the understanding of the pathogenic processes involved varies
with different types of cancer and different carcinogens, most theoretical approaches acknowledge the likelihood that most cancers result from complicated interactive processes involving more or less susceptible cells and a
variety of carcinogens. But various models differ as to the physical or chemical nature of those processes, and the causal significance of external agents
and genetic predisposition.
The lack of generally accepted causal models complicates the identification of carcinogens. And even when a particular factor or set of factors has
been identified as posing a cancer risk, competing causal models may imply
different "dose-response" relationships; that is, different assessments of the
precise magnitude of the cancer risk at varying levels of occurrence of the
carcinogen. In particular, there may be different judgments as to the existence
of safety "thresholds" below which no risk exists.
Without a firm theoretical base for the assessment of cancer risks, decisionmakers must rely upon statistical evidence regarding the relationship between
certain factors and cancer incidence. Such evidence may be gathered through
bio-assays in which animals are exposed to varying levels of suspected carcinogens in carefully controlled laboratory experiments, and through epidemiological methods relating the incidence of cancer in human populations to the occurrence of suspected carcinogens. Both of these types of evidence are open
to challenge. The relevance of bio-assay evidence rests upon the assumption
that carcinogenic processes in non-human biological systems are similar to
those in human biological systems. The weaknesses of epidemiological evidence arise from the difficulties in applying scientific control techniques outside the laboratory to mobile human populations.
Furthermore, both bio-assay and epidemiological evidence usually require that cancer risks at low doses of a carcinogen be estimated using techniques of statistical inference in order to extrapolate from the observation ot
cancer incidences at high dose levels. The use of high dosage levels in bioassays stems from the practical necessity of keeping the sample of exposed
animals to a manageable and affordable size.8 As for epidemiological evidence,
the long latency periods of many diseases means that the relevant data regarding "dose" are measures of exposure beginning twenty to thirty years before
8 The size of the sample required for tests of statistically significant differences in
the cancer rates of exposed and unexposed groups depends in part upbon the magnitude
of the differences one expects to find. The smaller the expected difference, the larger
the sample required. Conversely, by increasing the dose and hence the likely magnitude
of the difference, the required sample can be kept to a manageable size.
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the clinical manifestation of the disease. But past exposure levels, which occurred before the development and refinement of control technologies, typically entail high doses.
Apart from the distribution of the data regarding dose and response,
there are problems with their quality, particularly that of epidemiological data.
Changes in measurement technology, units of measure, and reporting requirements over time and across jurisdictions make for inconsistencies in timeseries and cross-national data on exposure levels. Data regarding the incidence
of disease are weakened by problems of mistaken diagnoses, particularly where
the disease is rare or its clinical signs non-specific; by disincentives for employers to retain records regarding illnesses related to hazards in the workplace; and by problems in tracking workers who have left the site of exposure
- such tracking being essential in order to distinguish between the effects of
cumulative dose and the effects of time since first exposure, as well as to ensure that the full incidence of disease is captured.
The significance for public policy purposes of this scientific debate over
causal models and experimental methods is not only the uncertainty it creates
but also its tendency to erupt into the political forum. The lack of resolution in
the scientific arena provides a range of models and methods from which a
selection can be made in the service of a political position. Furthermore, any
selection can also be criticized from an opposing political viewpoint. Hence,
models that attribute carcinogenic potential to congenital factors or to "lifestyle" factors such as cigarette smoking and diet are perceived among environmental and occupational health activists as part of a strategy by industrial interests to "blame the victim"." Conversely, models that indict a wide variety of
substances as carcinogens, either alone or in combination, are derided by
industrial interests as the result of "cancerphobia". 1'0
Experimental methods, as well as causal models, are also subject to this
sort of "politico-scientific" debate. The high-dose, non-human evidence of
bio-assays lends itself to caricature in this forum. Hence, the bio-assay
evidence implicating cyclamates as carcinogens has been derided by an American official because "an adult would have to drink 138 to 552 12 ounce bottles
of soft drink a day to get an amount comparable to that causing cancer in
mice and rats."" Conversely, the theoretical and experimental difficulties of
assessing low dose response have been interpreted to mean that no safe
9 Crawford, "Cancer and Corporations," Society, March/April 1981 at 23; Epstein,
The Politics of Cancer (New York: Anchor, 1979) at 425ff; Tataryn, Dying for a Living
(Toronto: Deneau and Greenberg, 1979) at 186.
10 Whelan, "Chemicals and Cancerphobia," Society, March/April 1981 at 5-8. Similarly, a recent address to the Canadian Nuclear Association attributed negative publicity
regarding the development of nuclear power to a phobic response, "Fear of N-Power
much like phobia, MD tells meeting", Globe and Mail (Toronto), June 10, 1981 at 9,
col. 3.
11 Letter from the Acting Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration to
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, May 17, 1973, quoted
in Lowrance, Of Acceptable Risk: Science and the Determination of Safety (Los Altos:
Kaufman, 1976) at 100-101.
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threshold can be proved to exist, and that the suspected carcinogen ought to
be banned. In the absence of firm experimental evidence, such arguments are
often bolstered by anecdotal evidence of low dose responses. 12 Such evidence
is scientifically of extremely limited value; in any given anecdotal case, the
dose may not in fact have been small; and in any event, possibly confounding
variables may not have been taken into account. Nonetheless, such evidence
is striking, immediate, and when science defaults, often persuasive.
The frequency and importance of this type of controversy in the public
policy arena has led a number of observers to identify the emergence of "transscientific" or "science policy" issues and to speculate about the appropriate
techniques for their resolution. In coining the term, Weinberg identified
"trans-scientific" issues as those which "can be asked of science and yet which
cannot be answered by science.... Though they are, epistemologically speaking, questions of fact and can be stated in the language of science, they are
unanswerable by science, they transcend science."' 3
Trans-scientific questions, then, have the following characteristics. They
can be framed in terms of systematic models or "causal blueprints" of physical
reality. The empirical testing and validation of these models by scientific methods, however, is constrained in any of a number of ways. One of the most
obvious is the ethical objection to testing on human subjects-a consideration
that clearly constrains scientific investigation of carcinogens. Another is the
insufficiency of available data, when the generation of sufficient data is impossible within given resource, time, or technology constraints. It may be necessary to test millions of laboratory animals, to monitor human populations
over decades or even generations, or to develop more refined techniques of
measurement. These constraints are partly technological and logistical and
partly imposed by the policy process itself. Policy-makers, for a variety of political, economic and ethical reasons to be noted below, are unlikely to be willing either to defer decisions about health hazards for decades or generations
or to commit the enormous resources entailed in "mega-mouse" or "megamonkey" experiments.
The range of trans-scientific issues is hence potentially very wide. Any
constraint on empirical testing reduces the certainty with which a scientific
model can be validated, although these constraints are more severe in some
cases than in others. Within this range there is a grey area in which scientific
judgment shades into a broader "policy" judgment.
Despite the difficulty of teasing out their separate influences upon a given
decision, there are important distinctions to be made between these two forms
of judgment as to the likelihood of a model's validity. Scientific judgments
turn upon such factors as experience with the relative power of experimental
techniques, analogy with more firmly established models, or even an intuitive
"feel" for the data. Policy judgments are essentially result-oriented. They may
be shaped in part by attitudes to risk, and by either analytic or cognitive de-

12

13

Castleman, "Preventing Catastrophe," Society, March/April 1981 at 9.
Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science (1972), 10 Minerva 209.

19821

Regulation and Scientific Complexity

vices dealing with risk. They may also be influenced by the credibility of various sources of scientific opinion. But policy judgments are likely to be most
heavily determined by the evaluation of their probable "results" against a
range of economic, political, and ethical criteria: how will various political
constituencies respond to an increase or a reduction in exposure levels?; is a
change in exposure levels likely to increase or retard the growth or efficiency
of particular industrial sectors or of the macroeconomy?; who bears the costs
and who receives the benefits of changes in exposure levels, whatever the magnitude of those costs and benefits?
These policy criteria themselves are not unambiguous, however. Policymakers are faced with complex networks of interdependent interests and
values, and with uncertainties as to individual and collective preferences. They
are faced, indeed, with perversely circular problems. Given the present state
of scientific complexity and uncertainty about health hazards, it is necessary
for those making decisions about exposure to those hazards to make policy
judgments about the likely validity of scientific evidence and inference. These
policy judgments are complicated by economic, political, and ethical complexities and uncertainties. But these economic, political, and ethical complications
themselves are exacerbated by the lack of an established body of fact accessible to lay understanding.
4

B. Economic Complications'
If the labour markets in which health hazards occur functioned perfectly,
the economic criteria for optimal risk allocation could be met by adopting the
straightforward policy of letting the market operate. Voluntary exchanges
would lead to a Pareto-optimal or welfare-maximizing point at which the sum
of the social costs of health hazards and the social costs of investment in risk
reduction would be minimized. Individuals, fully informed of the magnitude
of risk associated with a given hazard and free to choose among jobs, would
demand "risk premiums", in the form of higher wages, equal to the expected
costs to themselves of exposure to that hazard in the workplace. Employers
would invest in hazard abatement until the marginal investment equalled the
marginal reduction in the risk premiums demanded as a result.
In reality, labour markets in the health hazard arena do not display such
perfection. Barriers to labour mobility are present in some sectors, most notably in mining communities. Another barrier may be erected by the very identification of the hazardous substance: workers already exposed may be considered poor health risks by potential alternate employers. Externalities also
exist. Some, such as contamination of workers' families or mutagenic and teratogenic effects, may be partially captured in the bargaining process between
labour and management. But in other cases, such as the venting or discharging
of hazardous substances from the workplace into the general environment,
the interests of workers and third parties are not coincident. Third parties in
14 1 am grateful to my colleague Michael Trebilcock, from whose insights and
analysis I have drawn heavily in this section. See Tuohy and Trebilcock, Policy Options
in the Regulation of Asbestos-Related Hazards: Royal Commission on Asbestos (Ont.),
Study No. 3 (Toronto: Ont. Pub. Centre, 1982) at ch. 3.
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such cases face substantial transaction costs and enjoy little bargaining power
in any attempt to negotiate a reduction in emissions. These externalities may
be captured to some extent by relatively long-term market adjustments such
as lower real estate values, but even such long-term adjustments are likely to
entail windfall losses to third parties in the short term.
Information problems compound these disabilities of real-world labour
markets in allocating risk from health hazards. The magnitude of the health
risks from given hazards, particularly carcinogens, is in most cases either
unknown or shrouded in such scientific complexity and controversy that it is
inaccessible to lay understanding. Even in cases in which the probabilities of
various outcomes are relatively well-understood, individual attitudes toward
risk exhibit some strange biases and discontinuities (strange, that is, when
viewed within the analytic framework associated with the application of economic criteria, but not when viewed from a cybernetic perspective). There
appear to be consistent tendencies to over-value long-shots-to exaggerate
the true expected values of outcomes with low probabilities of occurrence but
high pay-offs (positive or negative). Specific cases, furthermore, command
greater attention than probabilistic data. 1"
When the probabilities themselves are uncertain, strategies to reduce this
uncertainty are likely to be devised to a limited extent, if at all, on the basis of
an analytic assessment of the marginal net benefit of additional information.
Organized labour, unorganized labour, and third parties face (in ascending
degree) substantial transaction costs and "free rider" problems in organizing
information search and dissemination activities. The magnitude of these costs
is likely to deter them from any marginal calculations regarding the value of
such activities, and they are more likely to engage in cognitive shortcuts to
give shape to the perceived scientific chaos: 10 that is, to rely on negative logic, 17
to engage in analogic thinking,' or to make anchored adjustments. 19 Finally,
when mobility is in fact limited, the perceived conflict between job security
and health risk may be resolved by ceasing to consider the latter.
It is not clear that these cognitive strategies lead to an over-all inaccurate
estimation of risk. But this lack of clarity in turn gives employers no clear and
consistent incentive to invest in risk-reduction technologies-it is likely to be
less costly to join the "trans-scientific" debate.

15

These various cognitive biases are discussed in Nemetz et al., Regulation of Toxic

Chemicals in the Environment (Ottawa: Econ. Coun. Can., 1980) at 48ff.
16 Steinbruner, supra note 1, at 103-20, provides a review of the literature regarding these and other cognitive devices.
'7 Negative logic is the practice of foreclosing a line of investigation by accepting
a single contradictory example, as when attempts to estimate safety thresholds of exposure are deemed unnecessary on the basis of anecdotal evidence of disease incidence
at very low exposures.
18 An example would be the structuring of collective decisions as if they were
household decisions.
19 That is, relating new information to an established conceptual structure, making
only marginal adjustments to those structures on the basis of the new information as
the need arises.
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These market imperfections appear to provide economic grounds for
some form of state intervention, but only if these state instruments are likely
to be less imperfect. The range of potential instruments are intended in varying degrees either to rehabilitate or to substitute for market forces.
Market-oriented instruments include those that would mandate or subsidize the generation and provision of information about health risks to employees, such as requirements for employers to maintain programmes of compulsory medical information and record-keeping for employees, to monitor
exposure levels, and to regularly disclose exposure levels and morbidity and
mortality rates. 20 The interpretation of such data would be highly controversial, however, given the lack of scientific control techniques implicit in the
mode of collection, together with the problems of tracking workers who change
employment and the long latency period of many diseases. To be effective in
genuinely reducing scientific uncertainy, such data would have to be fed into
a larger, collectively subsidized research enterprise. Moreover, while operating
on one type of market imperfection, these information-based strategies leave
others untouched-specifically, barriers to mobility, negotiating costs, free
rider problems, and externalities.
Another essentially market-oriented strategy would operate through insurance-type instruments. "Risk rating", for example, would relate an employer's contribution to workers' compensation plans to the record of his employees for occupationally-related disease and to his safety record. Employers
might also be permitted to base tax deductions for worker compensation contributions on average premiums for their industry, thus again rewarding those
whose records earn them lower premiums, and penalizing those with poorer
records. Still, the long latency period of the diseases involved and the role of
intervening factors in their etiology, would make such risk rating either scientifically suspect or prohibitively expensive. Such schemes would appear to have
more merit in the realm of occupational safety than that of occupational health.
In general, the market adjustments to these various forms of intervention
could be expected to occur marginally and over the long term. Even if they
were effective in economic terms, they do not meet political and ethical demands, which are essentially for a strong symbolic response to intense concern
over threats to life, and for a redressing of imbalances in political and economic markets.&2 1
Somewhat greater constraints on the operation of labour markets might
be imposed by stricter schemes of tort liability on the part of employers for
illness incurred as a result of exposure to occupational health hazards. This
option goes some greater distance toward meeting political and ethical con20

The existence and scope of such market-oriented instruments is discussed in
Brown, Canadian Occupational Health and Safety Legislation (1982), 20 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 90 at 91-92.
21 See discussion under "The Political Context" and "The Ethical Context", infra.
22 This option is explored at some length in Tuohy and Trebilcock, supra note 14,
at 7.1-7.44. See also Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation (1980), 33 Van. L. Rev. 1281.
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cerns. But as shall be discussed in a later section of this paper,2 there are substantial problems in litigating matters fraught with scientific complexities:
problems in establishing fact and in finding fault, problems of scope, and problems of increased delay and cost.
Other instruments, such as exposure level taxes or public standard-setting,
entail a more active role for the state. Taxing exposure levels seeks to impose
upon employers the true social costs of the hazard, and hence encourages
them to set exposure levels at a point at which the marginal social cost of
investment in risk reduction equals the marginal social benefit of that reduction. A correct tax schedule is crucial to this approach, and the calculation of
one requires knowledge of the true social costs of the hazard (that is, the marginal benefit function for risk reduction).24 Standard-setting may place even
greater demands upon public sector decision-makers. Here it is the public
sector decision-maker who must determine the welfare-maximizing exposure
level, and who must therefore know not only the relevant marginal benefit
function but also the marginal cost function.
These public sector decision-making processes are complicated not only
by the scientific uncertainty and complexity that disables economic markets,
but also by the complexity and uncertainty surrounding individual and social
preferences, and by the intrusion of the incentive structures of standard-setters
themselves into the decision-making process.
Economic complications, exacerbated by scientific uncertainty, confound all mechanisms, market and non-market, for achieving a socially efficient level of exposure to health hazards in the workplace. They may lead, on
economic terms alone, to some slight preference for market-oriented intervention strategies as the least flawed options. But what is more significant from
a political and ethical point of view is the tendency of economic criteria, with
their emphases on social welfare, to ignore distributive implications, and the
tendency of market-oriented strategies to take endowments as given in achieving their outcomes. In the public policy arena, economic criteria interact with
these and other political and ethical considerations in shaping decisions.
C. The PoliticalContext
From a political perspective, the problem presented by the issue of occupational health hazards is the need to respond to competing demands for
action (or inaction) with a policy that will be supported by an effective coalition of affected interests. The effectiveness of a coalition can be defined in
negative terms: an effective coalition removes potentially crippling vetoes that
might thwart either the development or the implementation of the policy.
See discussion under "Decision Rules", infra.
See Tuohy and Trebilcock, supra note 14, at 8.4-8.15. Most of the literature
relevant to the "exposure level tax" is to be found in the area of environmental health
hazards. See, e.g., Spence and Weitzman, "Regulatory Strategies for Pollution Control,"
in Friedlander, ed., Approaches to Controlling Air Pollution (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1978).
23

24
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Given the number of points in the political system at which vetoes (or at least
delaying tactics in many cases equivalent to vetoes) can be exercised, the
building of an effective coalition of support is considerably more difficult than
is the crippling of a policy. Furthermore, the building of effective coalitions in
particular policy areas must be accomplished in the general context of maintaining or extending the base of political support for governmental policymakers themselves. These complex decisions must be made in the context of
considerable uncertainty, not only regarding technical aspects of policy but
regarding constituency preferences.
Political decision-makers in Canada currently face a diffuse demand for
the control of both occupational and environmental health hazards. Indeed,
although the interests at stake in the workplace environment are not identical
to, and are at times in conflict with, those in the general environment, public
concern about hazards in one arena tends to reinforce concern in another.
Hence, workers have been likened by some environmentalist spokesmen to
human "early warning sytems" analogous to the canaries once used to detect
toxic gases in mines; and, conversely, concern over asbestos in public schools in
Ontario has heightened public concern over the mineral as an occupational
hazard. 5
In part, this diffuse demand stems from a general concern, partly induced
by government,-2 about preventive health measures in the face of higher than
average inflation rates in the curative medical care industry.2 t And in part it
arises from media attention to the agenda setting and maintaining activities of
environmental and occupational health activists in the United States and to
certain dramatic events at home. The demand, however, is volatile and its
configuration uncertain, particularly as public perception moves through what
Downs has termed the "issue-attention" cycle: the initial "alarmed discovery"
of health hazards gives way to a focus on the costs of controlling those hazards, which in turn eventually yields an institutional response. The cycle is
completed by a fading of public concern. 2
Downs applied his analysis to the general issue of environmental pollution, but it is important to recognize that within the general issue-attention
cycle of a problem such as environmental pollution there are a series of individual issue-attention cycles relating to particular hazards-a series that prolongs the life of the general issue but complicates the policy response. In both
the workplace and the general environment, threats to health, each affecting a
different numerical minority, become apparent at different times. Sequential
2

See Doern, The Politics of Risk: The Identification of Toxic and Other Hazardous Substances in Canada: Royal Commission on Asbestos (Ont.), Study No. 4 (Toronto: Ont. Pub. Centre, 1982) at 2.10-2.12.
26 See, most notably, Can., Department of Health and Welfare, A New Perspective

on the Health of Canadians (Ottawa: Gov't. of Can., 1974).
27 Bird, "The Public Finance of Health Care," Commentaries on 'the Hall Report

(Toronto: Ont. Econ. Coun., 1981).
28

Downs, Up and Down with Ecology: the 'Issue-Attention' Cycle (1972), 28 The

Pub. Int. 38 at 39-41.
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attention to these threats keeps the general issue on the political agenda. But
the fact that different groups are beneficiaries or cost bearers of different hazards at different times makes political log-rolling complicated, institutional
fragmentation likely, and hence substantially increases the negotiating costs of
reaching a decision.
Furthermore, despite this general concern, the configuration of demand
and support for policies in this area has not solidified. In large part, this stems
from the difficulties of sorting out wins and losses from risk reduction measures.
Almost all occupational and environmental health measures involve more
or less costly changes in production processes. There may be some off-setting
benefits for industrial interests, such as technological innovations that allow
for the recapture and use of material previously discharged into occupational
and general environments or increased worker productivity through decreased
absenteeism and disability. Widely ranging estimates of such costs and benefits
to industry have characterized the political debate over the control of occupational health hazards. But whatever the costs, they are likely to be borne
largely by industry in the first instance, and the ability of industry to pass
those costs along to consumers or back to employees depends upon the particular characteristics of the product and labour markets in question.
There is no similarly concentrated constituency of perceived beneficiaries
from occupational and related environmental health measures. It cannot be
assumed, as some commentators- do, that workers perceive themselves as
unambiguous winners from controls on occupational health hazards. Unless
such controls are accompanied by substantial compensation to those workers
already exposed, which has not happened in the past, controls on health hazards may be of dubious perceived benefit to workers with relatively long histories of exposure to such hazards. Such controls may be seen as likely to
threaten jobs and hold down wages by increasing production costs. And employees may fear that publication of the impaired health status of exposed
workers will reduce their opportunities for alternative employment. Health
hazards may therefore not be identified by workers most heavily exposed.
Nonetheless, once hazards have been identified, organized labour may respond
in defense of the interests of potentially or lightly exposed workers. Furthermore, as the actual cost of compliance becomes clearer through the process of
policy development and implementation, the perceived threat to jobs and
wages may decrease, and labour's support may become firmer.
It is not surprising, then, that organized labour has not been an agenda
setter regarding health hazards in the work place, either in Canada or the
United States. The initial identification of health hazards and pressures for
control have almost invariably come from groups associated with, but outside,
organized labour, from environmental groups, or from within government
29

See, e.g., Kelman, "Occupational Safety and Health Administration," in Wilson,
ed., The Politics of Regulation (New York: Basic, 1980) 256.
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agencies. Unions have tended to react to proposals once formulated and to
provide political support for control measures once established.
Environmental interest groups contribute to setting the occupational
health agenda, and often enter the arena in alliance or in competition with
other interest groups. These environmental groups, however, face even greater
difficulties in identifying and mobilizing constituencies. To develop political
support by emphasizing widespread wins rather than widespread losses from
the control of health hazards, citizens' lobbies or public interest groups have
relied heavily on ideology and symbolism, in particular what McFarland has
termed an ideology of "civil balance", emphasizing the need for citizen action
to counterbalance the concentrated power of elites in the policy arena 30 Their
tactical approaches to influencing policy, on the other hand, have in the United
States and increasingly in Canada, focused on the building of ad hoc coalitions
with politicians, journalists, agency officials and other pressure groups, as well
as the extensive use of public interest litigation, all backed by substantial research and analysis.
In Canada, the existence of the New Democratic Party (NDP) as a
forum of concern for both occupational and environmental health issues is of
considerable political significance. Canadian institutional arrangements make
both ad hoc coalition building among legislators and bureaucrats and public
interest litigation considerably more difficult than in the United States. In the
face of these difficulties, the NDP provides an electoral vehicle. Through its
association with organized labour it has been concerned with the workplace
environment. Its ideological distrust of concentrated corporate power, particularly multi-national corporate power, gives it an ideological affinity with environmentalist groups. Hence the pressing of these issues in Canada has been
more closely tied to the agenda of a political party than has been the case in
the United States.
In both the United States and Canada, the ideological forces bearing on
the issue of controlling occupational health hazards include the current public
policy ethos of "deregulation". So far, the regulation of health hazards seems
to be virtually the only major area in which there is considerable support for
a continued or increased governmental regulatory presence-support in public
opinion3 1 and at the policy-making level.32 Nonetheless, in the United States,
30 McFarland, Public Interest Lobbies (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978) at 8ff.
31 Canadian public opinion data in this area is, unfortunately, thin. Data from the
United States suggest majority support in the order of 52 percent for occupational
health and safety regulation (with 12 percent opposed and the remainder having no
opinion). Support for environmental protection regulations was found to be considerably
stronger at about 70 percent; reported in Levin, Politics and Polarity: The Limits of
OSHA Reform (1979), 3 Regulation 33 at 39.
32 The areas of occupational and environmental health were the only exceptions
to the general "deregulatory" sweep of the recent report of the Economic Council of
Canada on its Regulation Reference. The Council firmly advocated a strengthening
of governmental regulation in these areas. Economic Council of Canada, Reforming
Regulation (Ottawa: n. pub., 1981) at 126-29, 112-14.
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the establishment of a cabinet-level Task Force on Regulatory Relief, the
character of recent appointments to regulatory agencies, and the proposals to
relax standards under the Clean Air Act 33 now generating substantial conflict
in Congress indicate a strong ideological commitment and political will within
the federal administration to deregulate in the area of health hazards; and the
American example could well strengthen similar ideological currents in Canada. Indeed, the ideological tensions currently playing about the revisions to
apparent in the
federal occupational health and safety legislation have been
4
federal labour minister's rhetoric in separate addresses.3
In general, one should not over-emphasize the impact of the deregulatory
ideology in Canada, particularly given the entrenchment of regulatory instruments in the political economy of this country. It is, however, likely to have
an impact on political rhetoric and symbolism, and may lead to attempts to
streamline regulatory instruments through omnibus legislation, consolidation
of inspectorates, and reduction in paper burden.
A final type of political complication is introduced by the fragmentation
of institutional authority. In Canada, institutional responsibility for policies
relating to hazardous substances in occupational environments is divided not
only between federal and provincial governments but also within both levels
of government. The Ham and Beaudry Commissions observed that jurisdictional conflicts among provincial government agencies and departments in
both Ontario and Quebec created, by default, situations in which industry was
enabled essentially to regulate itself.33 A number of governments-Saskatchewan in 1972,36 Ontario in 1978,37 and Quebec in 1979 3 8-have attempted to
consolidate legislative occupational health and safety provisions and the responsibility for their administration. Similarly, a consolidation of occupational
health and safety provisions and revisions to Part Four of the CanadaLabour
Code"9 are currently under way at the federal level.
These intra-governmental consolidations, however, do not directly address
inter-governmental problems. Few formal mechanisms of inter-governmental
342 U.S.C.S. §§ 7401 et seq. (1973).
34 In one address, Gerald Regan stated that "the politically fashionable cry for de-

regulation cannot be allowed to detract us from making workplaces safer." In another,
however, he spoke approvingly of deregulation and, employing an increasingly popular
means of reconciling an increased regulatory presence with a deregulatory ethos, advocated a more self-regulating occupational health and safety system; List, "Regan contradicts himself on whether to streamline work-safety provisions", Tle Globe and Mail
(Toronto), June 20, 1981 at 16, col. 1.
35 Ont., Report of the Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of Workers in
Mines (Toronto: n. pub., 1976); Quebec, Comitj d'dtude sur la salubritd dans lindustrie
de ramiante, Rapport prfliminaire (Qu6bec: Editeur officiel du Qu6bec, 1976).
36 Occupational Health Act, 1972, S.S. 1972, c. 86, superceded by the Occupational
Health and Safety Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. 0-1.
37 The Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 83, superceded by
the OccupationalHealth and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 321.
38

An Act Respecting Occupational Health and Safety, S.Q. 1979, c. 63.
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co-ordination exist. Jurisdictional conflict in Canada has been handled less
through formal measures than through the delegation of substantial discretion
to administrative officials who then negotiate enforceable positions with each
other and with those who must comply.40
Governments, then, are faced with fragmented, diffused, and shifting demand from the potential beneficiaries of policy changes, and integrated demand from the potential cost bearers. They also face high decision-making
costs: high information costs are entailed in coming to grips with complex and
controversial scientific and technological evidence relating to health hazards,
and high transaction costs are entailed in mobilizing fragmented institutional
authority in response. In such circumstances, political science would suggest
that governmental responses will focus on structural change, delegating to an
issue-specific body the tasks of generating relevant information, mobilizing institutional authority, and negotiating with affected interests. 4 '
This type of policy response makes sense within either an analytic or a
cybernetic paradigm of political decision-making. In analytic terms, it is rational for legislators to reduce their own transaction costs by delegation to an
agency that has established or can establish expertise and a relevant policy
network, as long as they, the legislators, can be seen on a symbolic level as
having responded to demands for action. Given great uncertainties about volatile constituency preferences, moreover, it is rational for legislators to keep
their response as general as possible. The need for discretion is further increased given that affected interests possess the organizational, technological,
and financial resources to obstruct or support policies, and that policies must
therefore be negotiated with those interests.
The delegation of discretionary standard-setting authority to a specialized
agency is consistent not only with a rough calculation of the political costs
and benefits of various policies in the present context, but also with the weight
of past experience and established political routines. The propensity to grant
broad discretionary powers to specialized agencies at both federal and provincial levels in Canada has been extensively documented. 4 Diffuse demand for
protection from potentially hazardous substances has traditionally provided
the cue for governments to delegate to officials authority to negotiate quality
standards with the providers of these substances. And the use of flexible standards is more readily available in the Canadian political repertoire than are,
40 Doern, for example, has noticed the tendency to charge provincial officials with
the enforcement of federal guidelines and standards, which may not be consistent with
provincial standards, and to be granted considerable discretion in applying these various

standards. See Doem, The Political Economy of Regulating OccupationalHealth (1977),

20 Can. Pub. 22 at 27-29. A somewhat similar situation exists in the environmental
area; see Nemetz, supra note 15, at 157-59.
41
See Salisbury and Heinz, "A Theory of Policy Analysis and Some Preliminary
Applications," unpublished paper delivered to the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., Sept. 2-7, 1968; and Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics
(Urbana: U. of Ill. Press, 1964).
42
See, e.g., Anisman, A Catalogue of Discretionary Powers in the Revised Statutes
of Canada 1970 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975).
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for example, civil liability remedies or more market-oriented strategies. A cybernetic approach would favour the continuation of similar responses in the
absence of feedback indicating that they were no longer capable of maintaining an effective coalition of support.
The delegation of authority, of course, does not obviate the need to deal
with political complexities and uncertainties. It simply establishes the forum,
the standard-setting body. From an analytic perspective, the task of such a
body is to discover and to make hard trade-offs among the preferences of affected constituencies. From a cybernetic perspective, the task is more likely to
be seen as the shaping and mutual adjustment of those preferences. The implications of these differences will be more fully traced out in a later section. 43
Although these two approaches to political thinking differ as to whether
preferences are to be taken as given, they both accept political and economic
endowments or resources as given. In the policy arena, however, ethical considerations prevent this simplification from being made and introduce yet
another set of complications.
44

D. Ethical Dilemmas
The major complications introduced into the policy-making process by
ethical considerations concern the, distribution of health risks among individuals as human and social beings.
One of the major ethical considerations is the assertion of a "right" to
life that constrains both the allocation and the distribution of health risks. One
of the major tensions in modern ethics, both at the level of philosophical discourse and at the level of popular belief systems, concerns the extent to which
such a right can be considered absolute or contingent upon a range of other
social and individual values. One major stream of thought finds such a "natural" right inhering in each individual, deducible from his essential nature as an
autonomous being, and subject to curtailment only by his free consent. Another finds the basis of a right to life in its instrumental value for the attainment of all other valued things and, hence, presumably curtailable without
consent only when it ceases to have such instrumental value- as, arguably,
in cases of irreversible coma. And a third major stream, a utilitarian approach,
would find all rights and obligations, including those relating to life, contingent on social utility.
The intermingling of these streams of thought has led to a concept of life,
if not as an absolute right, at least as in a category of "specially valued
things". It is often argued that life, like love and friendship, cannot be subjected to a utilitarian calculus without destroying its "special value".'" Even
from a utilitarian perspective, life has been considered in a special class of
43 See discussion under "The Institutional Framework", infra.
44 1 am indebted to Michael Trebilcock and Alan Brudner for their contributions

to my thinking about ethical issues in the occupational health area. See Tuohy and
Trebilcock, supra note 14, at ch. 5.
45 See generally, Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis-an Ethical Critique (1981), 5
Regulation 33.

1982]

Regulation and Scientific Complexity

social utilities "vastly more important and imperative than any others,"
to be
"guarded by a sentiment not only different in kind but in degree." 46
A thoroughgoing utilitarian perspective, however, would not differ substantially from the economic perspective presented earlier; it accepts a criterion
of Pareto-optimality for the allocation of risk, and is not troubled by unequal
distributive outcomes. That these outcomes will be heavily influenced by unequal endowments is inevitable, given the basic engine for achieving Paretooptimal outcomes: an exchange economy characterized by freedom of accumulation.
In distinction to this utilitarian approach, however, much modern ethical
philosophy finds it possible to assess the distributive outcomes of the operation of economic markets-and of political forces-as morally objectionable
on a number of grounds. Taking the innate freedom and dignity of the individual, as opposed to social welfare, as its focus and ultimate criterion, this body
of thought takes an essentially procedural approach to questions of distributive
justice.
In some versions, the approach is explicitly procedural. A just outcome
in this view is that to which the affected parties freely consent. To the extent
that individuals are coerced into the bearing of health risks, the distribution of
those risks is unjust.4 7 And this coercion may, of course, be political or economic as well as physical in nature: it may stem from the unequal distribution
of political and economic resources.
In another stream of thought, the procedural aspects of the criterion of
distributive justice are more implicit. Rawls' A Theory of Justice 8 argues
that just outcomes are those to which any of the affected parties would assent
if he assessed it behind a "veil of ignorance" as to his own position in the
resulting distribution. Under this criterion, one distribution of risk is to be preferred to another not simply if it improves someone's position while leaving no
one worse off, but only if it improves the position of the least advantaged.
Ultimately, such judgments would tend to an equalization of risk.
These more or less conflicting ethical principles have at least one thing
in common: they are essentially analytic in nature, and turn heavily upon an
ability to assess the magnitude of health risks. From an ethical perspective,
then, there is a strong argument for the reduction of scientific uncertainty to
the greatest extent possible. And in at least one ethical view, the marginal
benefit of information (that is, reduction in uncertainty) is to be measured not
as its social benefit but as its benefit for the potentially least advantaged individual in the existing distribution of risk.
46 John Stuart Mill is thus quoted in Nisbet, Defending Cost-Benefit Analysis:
Replies to Steven Kelman (1981), 5 Regulation 39 at 42.
47 Kronman, ContractLaw and DistributiveJustice (1980), 89 Yale LJ.472; Fried,

Contract as Promise (Cambridge: Harv. U. Press, 1981) at 92-111; Zimmerman,
Coercive Wage Offers, (1981] Phil. and Pub. Aff. at 121.
48 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harv. U. Press, 1971).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 20, No. 3

But given the scientific complexity and uncertainty that, in addition to
political and economic inequalities, constrains informed consent, how are
ethical decisions about health risks to be made? Perhaps two criteria can be
drawn from the varied philosophical opinions sketched here, both relating to
the process of decision-making. In the first place, the process should be participatory: it should involve all affected interests in a way that removes as
much as possible the barriers to their free and informed consent. In the second
place, it should be deliberative: it should recognize the "special value" of life
and should seek a deliberate reconciliation of that value with competing values
and obligations.
It is likely that in this participatory and deliberative process, the competing values themselves will be shaped and their weights adjusted, that belief
systems will evolve over time. In a similar vein, from a jurisprudential point
of view, Fuller has described social decision-making processes as involving
"not ... disembodied 'values' but.., human purposes actively, if often tacitly,
held and given intelligent direction at critical junctures." 49
I.

THE CHOICE OF OPTION: STANDARD-SETTING
The most common governmental response (other than inaction) to occupational health hazards has been the establishment and enforcement of
standards limiting workers' exposure to those hazards. As argued earlier,10
there are compelling political reasons for the popularity of this response across
jurisdictions and even across types of political systems. The political imperative for governmental decision-makers is to be seen to respond to a broad and
diffuse constituency of concern over health hazards while maintaining sufficient flexibility to bargain with those concentrated interests who hold vetoes
over effective policy development and implementation. The promulgation of a
control standard, which is usually expressed as a maximum exposure level
measured on a graduated numerical scale, is well suited to these political
purposes. Such a response symbolizes control while allowing for negotiation of
the level at which the standard is to be set and the de facto range around this
standard within which exposure levels are judged acceptable in the enforcement process. These potential political advantages depend to a large degree
upon characteristics of the standard set and of the standard-setting process
itself.
Further, more than any other instrument under review, the design of the
standard-setting process can potentially be adjusted to take account of ethical
considerations; to redress imbalances in the ability of affected interests to influence decision-making about health hazards. The realization of these ethical
advantages, however, is not likely to occur without sacrifice of some political
advantages. Both political and ethical considerations, in other words, argue in
favour of a programme of administered controls on exposure; but the two
frameworks may well dictate different designs for such a programme.

49

Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication (1978), 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353 at

378.
50 See discussion under "The Political Context", supra.
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A standard-setting approach also offers several scientific advantages.
More than private bargaining or judicial or fiscal instruments, it can be structured to provide for direct scientific participation in the determination of exposure levels. And in comparison, at least to private bargaining and judicial
instruments, it is likely to generate through its monitoring component a more
consistent, comprehensive, and centralized record of exposure levels over time.
Strong support for this policy option, then, can be generated from political, ethical, and scientific perspectives. It is primarily from an economic perspective that a programme of administered standards appears less attractive.
Economic analysis, as discussed above, 5 1 demonstrates that market forces are
unlikely to lead to a socially optimal allocation of risk. But it also demonstrates that the varied informational difficulties that hamper the efficient operation of the market are also likely to lead to errors on the part of standardsetters, even assuming they seek to approximate efficient market outcomes.
Furthermore, to the extent that the programme is designed to take account of
distributive concerns on political or ethical grounds, Pareto-inefficient outcomes may well be chosen over Pareto-efficient outcomes. Socially acceptable
levels of risk, in political or ethical terms, may not be socially optimal from an
economic perspective. Despite these fundamental critiques of administered
standards as a means of achieving socially optimal levels of risk, however,
economic analysis does discriminate among different programme designs on
the basis of their relative efficiency in enforcing exposure levels once the levels
themselves have been established.
The extent to which the potential political, ethical, and scientific advantages of a programme of administered standards are realized, and the relative
efficiency with which they are realized, depends upon the design of the programme; on how and by whom standards are set. It depends, in other words,
upon the decision rules employed, and the institutional framework within
which they are employed.
IV. DECISION RULES
The contrast between analytical and cybernetic decision-making has been
identified and referred to throughout this paper, but nowhere is it more apparent than in the designing of a standard-setting programme. Can a standardsetting programme impose an analytic rationality upon the determination of
levels of exposure to hazardous substances? Should this framework be imposed, or is a programme design based on cybernetic principles more attuned
to the realities of human decision-making and hence more feasible? In practice, these general questions are formulated as a debate over the relative merits
of a number of decision rules as guides to the determination of acceptable risk.5 2
a) Zero Risk-The "Delaney" Principle: On its face, the simplest decision
rule would appear to be to tolerate no risk. This is the principle behind
51 See discussion under "Economic Complications", supra.
5 A similar categorization of decision rules is to be found in Nemetz, supra note
15, at 195-239.
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the 1958 Delaney Amendment to the FederalFood, Drug, and Cosmetic
ActP in the United States, which prohibits the introduction to food of any
additive found to be carcinogenic in either animals or humans."4 The implementation of a zero risk principle may involve either a ban on the use
of the suspect substance, or the reduction of exposure to zero or to a level
at which there are no detectible adverse effects-the safety threshold.
b) Technological Feasibility: Several jurisdictions tie the reduction of risk to
the capability of control technology by requiring that risk be reduced to
the extent possible with the "best available technology" or the "best practical means". Typically, technology-based criteria have been interpreted
to imply economic as well as technological feasibility, and have provided
channels for the introduction of explicit cost-benefit analysis in the selection of standards. As Nemetz et al. have put it, "'best' implies some consideration of benefits from the regulation, while 'practicable' implies attention to economic feasibility." 55
c) Weighing Costs and Benefits: Increasingly, regulatory decision-makers
are being pressed to make their decisions on the basis of an explicit weighing of costs and benefits of alternative policies, choosing only those alternatives whose benefits justify their costs. The least stringent cost-benefit
criterion is one of cost-effectiveness: the minimizing of costs for a given
objective; or the maximization of benefits for a given cost. Many practitioners would distinguish cost-effectiveness analysis from cost-benefit analysis entirely. Another criterion of comparison more consistent with the
underlying theory and purpose of cost-benefit analysis is the ratio between
benefit and cost. The quintessential cost-benefit criterion, however, is the
maximization of net benefit. It is important nonetheless to recognize that
there is in fact neither standard doctrine nor standard practice in costbenefit analysis-although disagreements at the doctrinal level are less
substantial than are divergences among actual practices and between practice and doctrine.
Let us consider briefly how each of these decision rules is likely, in the
context of the scientific uncertainty and complexity surrounding health hazards, to respond to the economic, political, and ethical concerns in this arena.
Economically, the weight of approval is clearly with the explicit weighing
of costs and benefits and the application of a cost-effectiveness, maximum net
benefit, or cost-benefit ratio criterion. Fundamental economic concepts of
welfare maximization or at least of technical efficiency underlie these prescriptions, and economic debate largely focuses on the application of particular
criteria and techniques in given situations. The zero risk principle violates the
most fundamental of economic principles by deeming opportunity costs irrelevant. The best available technology principle, to the extent that it smuggles in
53 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 301 et seq. (1972).
54Food Additives Amendment of 1958, P.L. 85-929, § 4, 72 Stat. 1785 (codified

at 21 U.S.C.S. § 348 (1972)).
55 Supranote 15, at 198.
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cost-benefit considerations, is more acceptable from an economic perspective,
although there is considerable skepticism as to the efficiency and feasibility of
this approach in practice. 56 Furthermore, it seems reasonable to argue from an
economic perspective that if the best available technology principle is acceptable because it implies cost-benefit considerations, it is even more preferable
to bring these considerations fully to light, while treating technological resources as a constraint.
The major economic reservation regarding explicit cost-benefit analysis
relates not to its principles but to its feasibility, given pervasive uncertainties
and imperfect measurement instruments. Relevent factors may be omitted in
the specification of the models predicting future outcomes. The parameters of
the model may be wrongly estimated because of problems with the format or
the accuracy of available data. The difficulty of estimating one parameterthe effect of exposure level on disease incidence-when data are clustered in
high dose regions has been noted above.57 Wrong assumptions may be made
about the stability of the parameters over time, particularly if they are sensitive to the effects of omitted variables. Mortality rates, to take one of the
starkest examples, may be profoundly affected by changes in therapeutic technology. Future changes in the levels of the factors outside the scope of the
regulatory policy (such as discount rates or even, more narrowly, corporate
tax rates) may be wrongly projected. An even more fundamental source of
error lies in uncertainties about preferences regarding valuation of intangibles
(such as years of life, disability, anxiety, and bereavement) that are not traded
on markets.
Recognizing the possibility of such errors of assumption and technique,
analysts often seek to test the sensitivity of their results to changes in model
specification, parameter estimation, and projected values. Where results are
fairly robust with respect to such changes, they can be more confidently
accepted. Unfortunately, models relating to health hazards deal in very low
probability ranges, in which changes of a fraction of one percent in estimated
probabilities can have substantial effects on estimated outcomes. This is particularly the case where large values are involved, or where several low-probability parameters have compound effects.
In most cases, however, it is probably fair to say that the precision and
rigour of the techniques involved in a cost-benefit analysis far surpass the
precision of the data to which they are applied. Standard-setters are typically
heavily dependent upon the regulated industry for data regarding likely capital and operating costs of compliance, production functions, and likely alternative resource uses. The accuracy of industrial responses to such data requests is likely to be reduced by real uncertainty, especially as to alternate
uses, and by a clear incentive for industrial interests to bias upwards their estimation of compliance costs.
56 See, e.g., id. at 198-99; Freeman and Haveman, Clean Rhetoric, Dirty Water
(1972), 28 The Pub. Int. 51 at 59; Gandall, "No one knows how much environmental
control costs us," Chemical and Engineering News, April 23, 1979 at 29-33.
57
See text accompanying note 8, supra.
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The estimation of benefits is similarly hobbled by data problems. The
lack of firm scientific evidence upon which to estimate the parameters of a
predictive model has been treated at some length above.55 Furthermore, data
regarding the age structure, years of exposure, and health status and habits of
the exposed population-all of which are ideally to be incorporated in a model
predicting the effect of changes in exposure levels-is rarely available. The
logical sources of such information (unions and labour ministries) have
lacked either the will or the resources to assemble it.
From an economic perspective, such reservations may lead to a prescription for more rather than less cost-benefit analysis; that is, for staged costbenefit analysis as more information, including the effect of incremental policy
changes, becomes apparent. Furthermore, the undertaking of the analysis itself
may be subjected to cost-benefit considerations, to ensure that it is undertaken only to the extent that the additional information it will generate at any
point in time is at least equal in benefit to its marginal cost.
Cost-benefit analysis, particularly the flawed version possible in the present state of the scientific field, responds much less well to the ethical implications of the health hazard arena. Ethical considerations support, and may indeed prescribe, a clear setting out of the incidence of the costs and benefits of
a policy, an identification of the winners and losers and the extent of their
wins and losses. But cost-benefit analysis, with its emphasis on social costs and
benefits, tends to mask these distributive implications; to be insensitive to
the fact that a change which increases net social benefit may leave a particular
segment of society much worse off. Furthermore, certain of the techniques of
cost-benefit analysis tend not only to mask but to bias distributive outcomes.
Several of these biases stem from the methodological choices made in
estimating the present value of future streams of costs and benefits, particularly
where these outcomes are intangible. Valuing lives in terms of foregone earnings or foregone tax payments, to take the most egregious example, clearly
places a higher value on the lives of high income earners and large taxpayers
than those of low income earners and welfare recipients. Valuing reduction of
the incidence of disease in terms of medical expenses saved places a higher
value upon the prevention of chronic, disabling diseases as opposed to those
that are swiftly fatal. High discount rates lead to a preference for immediate
benefits and deferred costs (and against policies with immediate costs and
deferred benefits), and hence discriminate against the interests of the young
and of future generations.
Cost-benefit analysis can in theory be made to address explicitly distributive issues, although it cannot resolve them. Net benefit can be calculated for
groups within society as well as for society as a whole, and the results arrayed
for judgment. In such cases, cost-benefit analysis may at best clarify the options, but it cannot provide the criterion of choice.
Cost-benefit analysis may also discriminate against the consideration of
58 See discussion under "Scientific Complexity and Uncertainty", supra.
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intangible values at all. In the valuation process, for example, the techniques
of deriving "maximum net benefit" or cost-benefit ratios (optimizing techniques such as linear programming and the calculus of constrained maximization) and the application of discount rates require that the value of positive
and negative outcomes be measured on a ratio scale (a scale with equal intervals and a zero point). Hence, levels of bereavement, for example, if they
were to be included in the analysis would have to be expressed on a scale such
that two widows could be said in a real sense to suffer twice as much as one.
Given that such measures would be so arbitrary as to be ludicrous, it is preferable to omit them from the formal process of predicting and valuing outcomes
entirely. The analyst may still, of course, flag intangible costs and benefits for
consideration alongside the prescriptions of the formal analysis, but costbenefit criteria provide no guidance for their inclusion in the final judgment.
The problem of valuing intangible benefits in units compatible with costbenefit criteria and techniques cannot, however, be avoided in the case of the
central benefit of reducing exposure to health hazards: the increase in years
of healthy life. Problems of valuing life have generated an extensive literature
and, as specific occasions arise, heated public debate.5 9
Some analysts seek,60 sensibly, to avoid these various problems by defining
the present value of future years of healthy life in terms of what individuals
are willing to accept in order to assume risks of future illness-the "risk
premiums" noted earlier.,' But in the real world individuals make decisions
about accepting these premiums in the context of very imperfect markets
characterized by information gaps and mobility constraints. Furthermore,
those individuals who choose to accept particular risks may well be atypical
of the broader class of individuals who might be exposed to those risks. As
Zeckhauser has pointed out, those whom we observe accepting risks are likely
to be those who for one reason or another value those risks least in relation
to the benefit they receive for assuming them. 62
Willingness-to-pay measures are further limited in that they capture at
best only the valuations that an individual himself (and perhaps his family)
places on the value of reduction of risk to his life. One responsd to these criticisms might be to look for measures of society's willingness to pay for risk
reduction in a given situation by observing its revealed preferences in analogous situations. But these social decisions are taken in the context of limited
information, and are constrained by political configurations particular to speci59 See, e.g., Zeckhauser, Procedures for Valuing Lives (1975), 23 Pub. Pol. 49;
Kelman, supra note 45; Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb: a Theoretical Approach
(1971), 79 J. Pol. Econ. 687; Nemetz, supra note 15, at 206-12.
0o E.g., Schelling, "The Life You Save May Be Your Own," in Chase, ed., Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis (Washington: Brookings Inst., 1968); Thaler and
Rosen, "The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labour Market," in Terleckyj,
ed., Household Production and Consumption (New York: Columbia University Press,
1975) 265.
61 See discussion under "Economic Complications", supra.
62 Zeckhauser, supranote 59, at 436.
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fie hazards; and the following of revealed preferences may simply mean that
the blind and the halt in one area lead the blind and the halt in another.63
In general, given the seemingly intractable difficulties in valuing life in
units common to those used to measure other benefits or costs of a policy,
some analysts would abandon the quest and seek at best to perform a costeffectiveness analysis of the number of lives or years of life that can be saved
at various levels of cost-in the present context, the number of lives or years
of life saved with more or less costly exposure standards. 3 This approach may
well be the only feasible one as long as standards are adopted on a hazard
by hazard basis. A higher or lower level of exposure to a given hazard increases or decreases total risk to life; it does not redistribute risk from one
life to another, and one simply assumes that adding to the pool of years of
life saved is better than subtracting from it. If one is considering the costeffectiveness of investing in setting standards relating to different hazards,
hovever, different lives are involved. Unless one is prepared to assume that
49a year of life is a year of life" to whomever it accrues at whatever point in
a lifespan, one is left again with the problem of valuing these lives according
to a metric that allows them at least to be compared to each other.
More fundamental than the objection that certain values cannot be incorporated (at least not without great strain and potential bias) in a costbenefit analysis is the ethical objection that certain values ought not to be
subject to a cost-benefit criterion. This is the argument, traced out above,0 5
that there is a right to, or at least a "special value" in, life, which cannot be
outweighed in a utilitarian calculus involving market-traded values, but rather,
must be reconciled with competing values and rights in a process of moral
judgment. In this sense it may be possible to speak of the right to a safe workplace that must be reconciled with the danger of requiring such a high level
of safety that the workplace itself disappears.
The ethical complexity of the health hazard arena would seem to admit
of no straightforward decision rule. The zero risk principle appears from an
ethical perspective to be an attempt to avoid the difficult moral judgments
implicit in investing in risk reduction in one area as opposed to another. The
best available technology principle may at best provide sufficient flexibility
and discretion for such judgments to be made, but to the extent that it pro63 In an attempt to determine the implicit criteria governing social decisions regarding risk, Starr has reviewed revealed social preferences in various areas of activity;
Social Benefit and Technological Risk (1969), 165 Science 1232. Most commentators,
however, point to the apparent inconsistencies in such decisions; see, e.g., Zeckhauser,
supra note 59, at 447-49; Dobell, "The Arithmetic of Risk", Policy Options, June/July,

1980 at 53-55; Okrent, Comment on Societal Risk (1980), 208 Science 372.
64 One application of such an approach is described in Page, Harris and Bruser,
"Waterborne Carcinogens: an Economist's View," in Crandall and Lave, eds., The
Scientific Basis of Health and Safety Regulation (Washington: Brookings Inst., 1981)
197. Zeckhauser and Shepard would develop this approach to measure benefits in terms
of "quality-adjusted life years"; Where now for saving lives (1976), 40 Law and Contem.
Prob. 5.
65 See text accompanying note 45, supra.
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vides direct guidance it is likely to become tantamount to a cost-benefit criterion.
If the resolution of ethical complexities requires deliberate moral judgment, at best informed by, but not restricted to, cost-benefit calculations, it
matters very much whose judgment is brought to bear. What is to prevent the
process of decision-making from degenerating either into confrontation and,
as one critic has put it, "holy war" among interest groups each claiming
"rights" and "special value", 6 or into a paternalistic autocracy of regulators
with virtually unlimited discretion to make "moral judgments"? 6 7 Clearly, we
are into the realm of politics, and need to consider the political implications
of these various decision rules.
The zero risk principle has a certain face attractiveness as a political
position. It accords with what Zeckhauser terms the social myth, 8 as opposed
to the ethical axiom, that life is priceless. Furthermore, it promises to provide
political decision-makers with a clear and simple cue: it delegates to scientists
the investigation of the question of the existence of risk and asks only for a
yes-no response. The repertoire of policy responses to that cue is almost as
simple. In its purest form, the zero risk principle implies a ban on the use of a
hazardous substance. In practice, because of the severity of this instrument,
attempts to impose a ban may lead to either substantially higher .or substantially lower levels of protection against health risks than might prevail under
other decision rules.
In political debate surrounding hazard control, the imposition of a ban
is likely to turn less upon scientific evidence than upon political mobilization.
Of all the policy responses, it offers the highest rewards to successful political
mobilization-the winner literally takes all. Despite the fact that under this
principle no risk is to be tolerated whatever the potential benefits, maybe the
bearers of the costs of a ban will introduce considerations of foregone benefits
into the political debate while seeking to minimize evidence of risk. In such
circumstances, unless the scientific evidence is overwhelming, science itself is
unlikely to determine the outcome. Science does not lend itself to categorical
judgment. The results of epidemiological surveys and bio-assays are probabilistic in two senses: they estimate risk, and the estimates rest upon statistical
techniques that offer less than one hundred per cent confidence in their accuracy. Opponents of the ban are likely to challenge such estimates on methodological grounds, and to focus the debate on the question of how sure we
must be that a substance is risky before entirely foregoing its benefits. Proponents of the ban are likely, on the other hand, not only to defend the scientific evidence, but to supplement it with reference to individual cases of disease incidence at allegedly very low levels of exposure. Such cases may have
a persuasive power far beyond their scientific merit. appealing as they do to
66 Delong, Defending Cost-Benefit Analysis: Replies to Steven Kelman (1981), 5
Regulation 39 at 40.
67 Butters, Calfee, Ippolito, Defending Cost-Benefit Analysis: Replies to Steven
Kelman (1981), 5 Regulation 42.
68
Zeckhauser, supranote 59, at 447.
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cognitive preferences for negative logic and specific cases as opposed to probabilistic data, and to the emotional significance of identifiable suffering.
Other, less draconian forms of implementing a zero risk principle, such as
the reduction of exposure to zero or to a safety threshold through control
technology, entail somewhat different political dynamics. Under a ban (unless
it is selectively imposed or unless a black market develops), producers and
consumers of the banned substance eventually adjust to its absence and dissolve as political constituencies. Where a substance remains in production behind a technological shield, on the other hand, political constituencies of beneficiaries and potential risk bearers remain in existence. Furthermore, the perceptions of the permeability of the shield and the effects of low doses are
dependent on the technology of detection and the state of scientific knowledge,
and they are susceptible to continual challenges on the grounds of negative
logic and identifiable suffering similar to those surrounding the imposition of
bans.
The political merits and demerits of the "best available technology" principle differ considerably from those of zero risk. The symbolic value of the
principle is not as great: it can imply a capitulation to technology and to industrial interests. The cue it provides is not as simple, because the determination of the best available technology (or the best practical means) seems to
imply the application of at least a cost-effectiveness if not a maximum net
benefit criterion. But the principle does, in contrast to the zero risk principle,
provide policy-makers with a wide range of discretion and flexibility in negotiating with affected interests.
It is with respect to cost-benefit decision rules that the most complex
political problems arise, and the clashes and complementaries between analytic
and cybernetic approaches to political decision-making become most apparent.
At one level, cost-benefit analysis promises to reduce large amounts of complex information to relatively simple decision cues. Ironically, then, these
highly analytic techniques may be chosen because they facilitate a cybernetic
approach to decision-making at the political level. They allow the political
decision-maker to delegate to the analyst, to a large extent, the cognitively
difficult process of making judgments involving trade-offs, and to respond
simply to the "bottom line" of the analysis. And they appeal, symbolically, to
another social myth, the myth that government is accountable for efficient
operation.
The na'vet6 of this impression of the political role of cost-benefit analysis
soon becomes apparent in practice. Cybernetic decision-makers are unlikely
to embrace ultimately such analysis despite its cueing function as it accords
poorly with the more usual cybernetic strategies of attending to familiar
sources, making tentative probes of the environment, and responding to feedback with incremental change. Even for those who take a more analytic approach to political decision-making, an analysis of the positive and negative
social impacts of a policy will not necessarily reveal the political costs and
benefits of adopting that policy. The political calculus requires an understanding of the distributive implications of the policy and of the significance ol
various constituencies of affected interests to an effective coalition of support
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for the policy and the policy-maker. The balance of social costs and benefits
of a policy is irrelevant if it generates sufficient political opposition to defeat
itself or its sponsor. From a political perspective, a consideration of the costs
of buying off vetoes needs to be overlaid on the analysis. And the more complex these analyses of the social, distributive, and political impacts of the
policy become, the more likely it is that political decision-makers will resort
to responding to relatively simple cues of approval or disapproval from their
traditional constituencies of support and, if necessary, from potential supporters. The more uncertain are these preferences, the more likely it is that
political decision-makers will attempt to shape those preferences through the
very process of presenting, responding to, and modifying policy proposals.
It should not be assumed, moreover, that such negotiation necessarily
imposes only costs on political decision-makers. For at least some politicians,
the bargaining process is a more familiar and indeed enjoyable mode of making trade-offs than is analysis, and may in itself yield considerable psychic
rewards. Even where an initial political commitment to formal cost-benefit
analysis has been made, it may well dissolve in favour of a negotiated outcome, or at least be subject to continual political intervention.
This understanding may help to explain why cost-benefit analysis is more
popular in the bureaucratic than in the legislative arena. Those drawn to bureaucratic careers may be less inclined by profession and temperament to derive enjoyment from the negotiation process; moreover, the bureaucracy is
increasingly inundated with delegated issues for which the legislature has had
neither the information, the time, nor the will to negotiate a resolution. In such
a situation, bureaucratic decision-makers themselves may well seek to delegate the making of trade-offs to cost-benefit analysts and to limit their own
role to a response to the relatively simple cues of cost-effectiveness and maximum net benefit measures.
Those decision-makers, elected or appointed, who seek such simple
cues, however, are inevitably frustrated. Cost-benefit analysis is enormously
sensitive to assumptions made therein-regarding the definition of factors to
be considered as costs and benefits, discount rates, methods of valuing life, the
specification of predictive models, and mathematical modelling techniques. At
almost every stage the techniques are capable of extracting information from
ratio scale data, but lose much information that does not initially present itself in those terms and must be "translated" or excluded. This information bias
is no less strong for deriving from analytic capabilities than from cognitive
predilections. Beyond this technical bias, however, the methods of cost-benefit
analysis are highly manipulable. Mendeloff reports a study in which seventytwo estimates of net benefit of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) two fibre per c.c. standard for asbestos were computed,
using various possible combinations of three assumptions about the number of asbestos-caused deaths, three assumptions about the trend of benefits
and costs over time, two time periods of varying lengths, two discourit rates
and two measures of benefits. The resultant benefit: cost ratios ranged from
0.07 to 27.70.9
69 Mendeloff, Regulating Safety (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979) at 63.
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As in the case of conflicting scientific evidence, which often contributes
in part to conflicting cost-benefit analyses, discrepancies in the results of costbenefit analysis are usually biased in favour of the political and economic interests of their sponsors, and are fast eroding the political credibility of the
approach. Cost-benefit analysis is increasingly viewed as a political as much
a an analytic tool. Although the assumptions that lead to widely differing
estimates may be laid bare in the debate over rival analyses (a point which is
made much of by proponents of the technique who applaud its ability to reveal
underlying assumptions and ideologies), debate over those technical assumptions tends to exclude all but the initiate. In the words of a former OSHA
head, "you can make your study; I can make my study. Nobody really
knows."70

Not only may cost-benefit analyses be used to support a particular political position, they may be used to delay action on a policy. Requiring standardsetting agencies to undertake such analyses may reduce the number of hazards
that the agency can address, and may delay the action that it can take on any
one. And it must be noted that delaying agency action may not simply defer the
costs to the regulated industry, but may also substantially reduce them. Delay
may provide time for the coalition of support for a standard to unravel, or for
the issue to move to a point in the "issue-attention cycle" at which costs of
control are more heavily weighted or where concern with risks has abated.
In the light of these considerations, it makes little sense to mandate costbenefit analysis unless one is seeking a mechanism, with some face validity,
for hamstringing the regulatory agency. It also seems unlikely, on the other
hand, that cost-benefit analysis can be avoided. The industrial interests, who
at least in the first instance bear the costs of compliance, may be benefitted by
the introduction of cost-benefit considerations. Not only do such interests have
ready access to the information and the economic expertise necessary to conduct such analyses, but they can also delay action by engaging the regulators in
a cost-benefit debate. In response, regulators and prospective beneficiaries of
the standard may be driven to performing or commissioning countervailing
analyses or appealing to rights, duties, and other values.
Some would maintain, indeed, that this process of partisan analysis and
value reconciliation through political interaction is the most intelligent that
can be expected in the public policy arena. It draws upon both the analytic
and the cybernetic capabilities of the political system. By so doing it ensures
that the widest range of values is brought to bear upon policy choice, and that
bias, to some extent, counteracts bias in the interpretation of relevant information. This is Lindblom's now familiar thesis of the "intelligence of democracy" 71-a thesis captured in the inimitable prose of one of Lindblom's most
faithful disciples, Wildavsky, as follows:
the truth [that analysts] have to tell is not necessarily in them, nor in their clients,
but in what these cerebral prestigitators often profess most to despise, their give

70 Cited in id. at 65.

71 Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1965).
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and take with others whose consent they require, not once and for all, as if the
social contract were forever irrevocable, but over and over again. This policy
72
process is certainly exhausting, hardly exhilarating, but hopefully enlightening.

We return, then, from a political as well as an ethical perspective, to the
need for deliberate reconciliation of competing values in standard-setting. In
that process, cost-benefit analysis will play a role, but conflicting analyses
will themselves have to be reconciled. What this discussion of decision rules
leads to is the central question of who is to participate in this reconciliation
process. Who is to identify the rights and duties at stake, and the relevant
positive and negative outcomes to be considered? Who is to do the deliberate
reconciling of these factors? What is to be the structure of the relationship
between decision-makers and affected parties?
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The institutional framework of standard-setting under general enabling
legislation shapes the relationships between the decision-makers and the affected interests, and the relations among affected interests themselves. Different
structural and procedural options have different implications for the range
and weighting of the interests involved, the range and nature of options considered, the source, type, and format of the information used, and the transactions entailed. In general, the options coalesce into four different models of
the relations between decision-makers and affected interests-bargaining, managerial discretion, adjudication, and consultation. Each of these models exhibits a rather different mix of analytic and cybernetic characteristics, which
renders it well or ill suited to the conditions that characterize the health hazard arena.

V.

A.

Bargaining

On first consideration, it may strike the reader as somewhat naive to treat
bargaining as a model of relationships separate from managerial discretion,
adjudication, and consultation, when each of the latter three models in practice entails elements of bargaining. Nonetheless, it is worth tracing out the
implications of a model based upon bargaining relationships among affected
interests, a model in which bargaining is essential to decision-making. In this
model, the bargaining process is what produces the decision and gives it its
legitimacy; the decision is the consensus reached by affected interests.
In its pure theoretical form, bargaining is a process of reciprocal control
among actors, based on their respective control of mutually valued resources,
and entailing "a voluntary exchange.., which each believes will render him73
better off than he was before (or would be in the absence of) the exchange.
Practical incarnations of this model are rare in North American standardsetting systems: perhaps the closest approximation is the "offeror" procedure
utilized by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) in the United
72
3

Wildavsky, supranote 1, at 405.

7 Schuck, Litigation, Bargaining and Regulation (1979), 3 Regulation 26 at 30.
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States.7 4 Its organic statute authorizes the CPSC to contract with an outside
organization (the offeror) to develop a product safety standard through systematic negotiations with affected interests such as consumers, large and small
manufacturers, retailers, and the like. The CPSC, however, may accept, reject, or modify the standard developed by the offeror.
It is necessary to step outside the North American system to a considerably different system of political culture and institutions to find a closer approximation of the bargaining model in the standard-setting process. In Sweden, to take the outstanding example, commissions representative of a variety
of affected interests make binding standard-setting decisions regarding occupational and environmental health hazardsY5 The strong corporatist aspects of
Sweden's political culture and institutions have rendered this bargaining process more accommodationist than adversarial. As several political commentators have noted, Canadian regulatory processes also exhibit corporatist elements; 76 but these processes have not effectively embraced labour interests,
and a bargaining model could be expected to work very differently in the
Canadian context. It is in that context that the model will be evaluated here.
The strengths of the bargaining model are compelling, particularly in the
face of the complexities that characterize decision-making about health haz77
ards. It does not require a central decision-maker to deal "synoptically"
with all of the inter-related variables and the multiple criteria relevant to the
decision; but rather, makes more limited (though still substantial) demands
of human intelligence. That is, it requires of each participant the capacity to
perceive the effects of a variety of solutions upon his own interests, and to
have sufficient appreciation of the preferences of other participants to be able
to devise a bargaining strategy.
The bargaining process, moreover, has the capacity to generate a wide
range of potential solutions, as each participant makes proposals and revises
them in the light of reactions from others. Furthermore, these proposals are
generated by those directly affected by, and therefore sensitive to, the problem
at hand.
The major strength of the bargaining process, however, is in the cfiaracter
of the relationships that it encourages. It brings affected parties face to face
with each other (we are dealing here with an explicit bargaining model, not a
74
The CPSC was created under the Consumer Product Safety Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C.S.
§ 2053(a) (1982).
75

See Williams, Government Regulation of the Occupational and General Environ-

ments in the United Kingdom, United States and Sweden, Background Study No. 40
(Ottawa: Sci. Coun. of Can., 1977) at 114 et seq.; Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981).
70 Doern, "Introduction: The Regulatory Process in Canada," in Doern, ed., The
Regulatory Process in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1978); Rea and McLeod, eds.,
Business and Governments in Canada (2d ed. Toronto: Methuen, 1976) at 334-45;
Tuohy, Private government, Property, and Professionalism (1976), 9 Can. J. Pol. Si.
668.
77 The term is Lindblom's. See, supra note 71.
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model of tacit bargaining where, for example, various parties make independent submissions to an arbiter). Face to face participation in decision-making,
as Lowi has implied, 78 constitutes an important political resource for each
participant vis-A-vis non-participants, and encourages log-rolling and compromise among participants, increasing the likelihood of a mutually acceptable
solution. And, to a greater extent than the other models to be considered, bargaining leaves decision-making power (even if not institutional authority) with
the affected interests themselves, and reduces the coercive presence of the
state. As Schuck has put it: "A bargained solution depends for its legitimacy
not upon its objective rationality, inherent justice, or the moral capital of the
institution that fashioned it, but on the simple fact that it was reached by consent of the parties affected." 79 Given their legitimacy, and the process of mutual adjustment that shapes them, bargained solutions are likely to face fewer
vetos and contrived obstacles in the implementation process than those more
coercively derived and imposed.
Bargaining processes are, however, susceptible to severe biases from imbalances in the bargaining power and in the participation of affected interests,
and from particular bargaining strategies. The imbalances among the organizational, financial, and political resources of concentrated and diffuse interests, and of management and labour interests in the health hazard arena
have been reviewed above; 80 but it is worth devoting some attention here to
biases introduced by bargaining strategies.
These biases are largely concerned with the distortion of information
about preferences and technical aspects of issues. The ability of affected interests to exploit scientific controversy and uncertainty by presenting those
scientific interpretations and inferences that best support their respective policy
preferences has also been noted earlier.8 ' The bargaining process must rely
upon these information biases themselves to counteract each other; it provides
no source of information apart from the contending parties. And it provides
no mechanism for the resolution of scientific uncertainty itself. It may therefore exaggerate areas of scientific controversy; put another way, it may define
legitimate scientific issues as "trans-scientific" issues and resolve them on the
basis of negotiation rather than scientific judgment. McGarity refers to this as
the problem of the "contrived" science policy issue, in which an affected party
may "attempt to convert a well settled scientific question into a science policy
question by locating a very biased or radical scientist... to testify that a
scientific dispute exists on that issue."'8 2 The pure bargaining process entails
no mechanism, apart from the bargaining power and sophistication of rela78

(1970),

Lowi, Decision Making vs. Policy Making: Toward an Antidote for Technocracy
30 Pub. Ad. Rev. 314 at 316; Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice

(1972), 30 Pub. Ad. Rev. 298.
79 Schuck, supra note 73, at 31.
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See discussion under "The Political Context", supra.
See text accompanying note 9, supra.
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tively evenly matched participants, for establishing a boundary between contrived and real trans-scientific issues. Indeed, there is no mechanism, again
apart from the resources and sophistication of the bargainers, for determining
the assumptions entailed in the models upon which varying scientific interpretations are based and for establishing the core of scientific "fact" upon which
the effects of a policy might with as much accuracy as possible be predicted.
Bargaining, in short, allows trans-scientific issues to be resolved at the risk of
ignoring areas of relative scientific certainty.
Another type of bargaining strategy may reduce the flexibility which this
model theoretically offers. As Schelling has pointed out, bargaining power
can be manufactured, in the absence of other resources, by binding oneself
to a particular position; for example, by making a commitment to a third
party, and thereby forcing other participants to adjust to one's own positiona "burning of the bridges" ploy.m This is, of course, a risky strategy, given the
possibility of stalemate; and some sophisticated casuistry may have to be employed by one or more participants to redefine the original commitment and
to allow for some movement to reach a negotiated outcome. A related strategy
is the assertion of non-negotiable "rights" as a constraint on the bargaining
process. Bargaining, based as it is on consent and not on inherent justice, can
be disabled by claims of right unless, again, a good deal of casuistic reinterpretation is employed. Finally, bargaining processes are susceptible to a strategy
of delay. Such a strategy is likely to be employed, for example, by a participant
who believes that delay will give a coalition of other participants time to unravel. But there is an outer limit on the use of this strategy, given the assumption underlying the bargaining model, namely that coming to some agreement
is preferred by all participants over failing to reach agreement at all.
The strengths of the bargaining model, in summary, derive largely from
its cybernetic characteristics-from the capacity of face to face group dynamics
to generate shared perceptions and consensus, from its relatively limited demands upon the information processing capabilities at any one point in the
system, and from its iterative and flexible process of "trying out" various proposals and varying them in the light of reactions. The shortcomings of the
model relate largely to its analytic weaknesses: its tendencies to bias the
weighting of interests and the review of information according to the bargaining power of the respective parties.
Even the cybernetic strengths of the model in coping with complexity
and uncertainty, however, are likely to be realized only under certain conditions. First, affected interests must be roughly equal in bargaining power, informational resources, and expertise so that information biases may counteract each other and scientific and trans-scientific issues may be realistically
identified. Second, the political and legal contexts must discourage the assertion of substantive claims of right, which can limit the flexibility of the bargaining process.
83
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963)
at 29-3 1.
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The health hazard arena, however, is characterized both by unequally
endowed interests and by assertions of claims of rights. Hence bargaining
alone is unlikely to resolve the scientific, political, economic, and ethical problems presented by health hazards. It is likely to leave potential areas of scientific agreement unestablished, to leave diffuse political demand unsatisfied, to
reach Pareto-inefficient outcomes (by distorting information regarding preferences and technical effects), and to weight interests according to their political
and economic endowments rather than by their free and equal interaction.
B.

ManagerialDiscretion

A more common model for the structure of relationships between decision-makers and affected interests in the standard-setting process draws its
theoretical integrity from the analytic paradigm. The model of managerial discretion assigns to one centre of decision-making, separate from the interests
affected by the hazard, the responsibility of developing and enforcing specific
standards under a general legislative mandate. In theory, the identification and
weighting of interests and the generation of information in this model are
not dependent on the degree of organization or the bargaining power of particular interest groups. The decision-maker is charged with balancing a variety
of interests and values, as more or less explicitly identified in his mandate,
regardless of the organization and resources of affected parties. He is free to
choose the standard which, in his disinterested, analytic, and "synoptic" view,
is most consistent with his mandate, and is not bound to choose from options
presented by affected parties-or indeed to consult with those parties at all.
It is this model that underlies the formal structure of most Canadian standardsetting processes in the occupational health arena.
In the most analytically inspired version of this model, decisions are to
be taken in accordance with the precepts of management science and policy
analysis: preferences are taken as given in the mandate; complex information
is organized into systematic models, decisions about reductions in uncertainty
are made on the basis of the marginal net benefit of further information, and
alternate standards are compared on the basis of given preferences, analytic
models, and available information. Consultation with affected interests may. be
necessary to refine the models and to obtain information, but it occurs at the
discretion of the decision-maker.8
In practice, the discretionary setting of standards by administrators under
general enabling legislation is not nearly so analytic. The analytic model assumes a given set of preferences and an information-generating and processing
capacity-but the mandate and the resources that usually accompany the
delegation of standard-setting authority are rarely sufficient in these respects.
Typically, in Canada as elsewhere, mandates have been vague (usually because conflicts in preferences have not been resolved at the legislative level)
and programmes of standard-setting and enforcement have been added to
existing workloads with little increase in resources.8 5 Under such circum84
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stances, theories of organization predict, and experience confirms, that the process will be subsumed within the established operating routines of the administering agency. In the less common case in which a relatively vague mandate is
accompanied by resources, on the other hand, the mandate is likely to be reinterpreted in the direction of the goals or "world view" of the dominant
coalition within the administering agency. It may indeed precipitate some regrouping of coalitions within the agency.8 6
The standard operating routines in Canadian regulatory administrations
have been likely to involve considerable interaction with the regulated industry, which, in the absence of a specific mandate or of information resources,
can provide a source of decision criteria and technical information. The desire to promote a less arbitrary and more comprehensive canvassing of interests and information by regulatory decision-makers, while maintaining a
disinterested and independent centre of decision-making, has led to proposals
for various forms of guaranteed access by affected parties to regulatory decision-makers. One of these models, which is increasingly coming to characterize administrative rule-making in the United States, is the model of adjudication.
Adjudication
Following Fuller87 and Eisenberg, 88 we can define adjudication as a process that structures the relationship between affected interests and decisionmakers around the following norms:
a) Each party must have the opportunity to present proofs and reasoned
arguments for a decision in his favour to the decision-maker.
b) The decision-maker must be impartial and must attend to and be capable
of comprehending those arguments.
c) The decision-maker should normally answer those arguments in explaining
his decision.89
d) "The decision should be strongly responsive to the parties' proofs and
arguments in the sense that it should proceed from and be congruent with
those proofs and arguments" and should not be based on principles, facts,
or arguments not presented by the parties themselves. 0

C.

This general model comprises a number of variants of relative degrees
86 Montjoy and O'Toole, "Organization Theory and the Implementation of Policy
Mandates," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society for Public
Administration (Mar. 30-Apr. 2, 1977).
8T
Fuller, supranote 48.
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for Lon Fuller (1978), 92 Harv. L. Rev. 410.
89 Eisenberg treats this as a "norm", id. at 412; for Fuller, explanation is not necessary, but promotes the fairness and effectiveness of the adjudicative process, supra note
49, at 387-88.
90 Eisenberg elevates this norm to definitive importance, supra note 88, at 413; for

Fuller, it is an unobtainable ideal which should be approximated as closely as possible,
supranote 49, at 388.
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of formality: all entailing rights to notice and hearing by an impartial judge;
most entailing rights to counsel and rights to cross-examine adverse witnesses;
and the more formal, entailing a keeping of a written record against the possibility of subsequent review, and increasingly strict rules of evidence.
Traditionally, this model has been held to apply only to those administrative decisions that apply general policy rules to individual parties in specific
cases according to their particular circumstances, and not to the decisions formulating the general rules themselves.91 This distinction between "adjudication" and "rule-making" has never been clearcut, however, and it is particularly difficult to maintain regarding the standard-setting activities of administrative agencies. Although the standards governing exposure to health hazards, to take the issue at hand, are clearly "rules" in the sense that they are
generally applicable and prospective in effect, they may have a retrospective
effect on a relatively small number of identifiable parties. In the extreme case,
a ban on a hazardous substance, while prospective from the point of view of
those whose exposure to the substance is thereby prevented, imposes costs
retrospectively on producers left with existing stocks of the substance, and
those with capital (including human capital) investment in its production. 92
In the United States, the Administrative ProcedureAct93 has, since 1946,

required rule-making agencies to follow "notice and comment" procedures involving the publication of proposed rules and the provision of an opportunity
for affected parties to respond in writing to those proposals. Indeed, the Act
in effect codified the principles that had already evolved in administrative practice and case law. In the last fifteen years, moreover, rule-making procedures
in the United States have increasingly become subjected to the constraints of
the adjudicative model.
To some extent, this judicialization of rule-making procedures in the
United States has been the result of Congressional action. Unable to frame
specific mandates, Congress has sought to constrain administrative discretion
by imposing procedural requirements on the adjudicative model, or stringent
standards of judicial review upon a wide range of regulatory decision-making.
Another source of the perception of the increasing judicialization of the regulatory process in the United States is the increasing tendency of affected parties
to litigate standards. Administrative law itself appears to be in a state of flux
regarding the applicability of the adjudicative model to the activities of regulatory bodies. Several lower court decisions have tended to a relatively broad ap01 In the United States, the Supreme Court in United States v. Florida East Coast
Raihvay, 410 U.S. 224 (1973), held that the Interstate Commerce Commission was not
required by administrative law to conduct trial-type procedures in promulgating an
across-the-board incentive, per diem rate increase. The Court relied on what it termed
"a recognized distinction in administrative law between proceedings for the purpose of
promulgating policy type rules or standards... and proceedings designed to adjudicate
disputed facts in particular cases," and referred to Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Board

of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915)

and Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).

See also academic treatments of this distinction in Davis, Administrative Law of the
Seventies (Rochester: Law. Co-op. Pub., 1976), and McGarity, supra note 82, at 770-71.
Id.
93 5 U.S.C.S. §§ 551 et seq., 701 et seq. (1980).
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plication of the formal adjudicative model, while the United States Supreme
Court has ruled that the courts cannot require an agency to adopt more formal
procedures in rule-making than are required by its organic statute or by the
Administrative Procedures Act.94 Finally, regardless of whether American
courts are judicializing regulatory rule-making by requiring agencies to meet
formal procedural requirements, they are certainly judicializing it by taking
an active substantive role in the process themselves. The courts are increasingly unwilling to defer to agency judgment in substantive matters, and are
increasingly committed to taking a "hard look" at both substantive and procedural aspects of agency decision-making. 95
In the face of these Congressional signals, litigious interest groups, juridical uncertainties, and judicial activism, it is not surprising that regulatory
agencies in the United States are adopting more formal procedures in an increasing number of cases to protect themselves against reversal on appeal.
OSHA, for example, includes a standard clause in notices of proposed rulemaking hearings giving the presiding administrative law judge authority to
permit the questioning of witnesses, and cross-examination is typically permitted in important cases, such as the asbestos and vinyl chloride hearings.
In Canada, rule-making authority regarding occupational health hazards
rests with federal and provincial ministries and cabinets, and few procedural requirements are imposed by enabling statutes. Various provincial environmental
protection acts, on the other hand, require or provide for public hearings to
assess the environmental impact of specific projects, including matters of
health hazards, but even these have been weakened and discredited in some
cases, notably Ontario, by liberal use of exemption clauses.00 Furthermore, no
procedural requirements have been imposed upon ministerial or cabinet
standard-setting by the courts, although there have been some recent indications of movement in this direction.9 Indeed, even in reviewing regulatory
decisions of independent regulatory agencies, Canadian courts have shown
enormous restraint compared with their American counterparts. They have
generally granted agencies broad discretion in substantive and procedural matters, applying standards of ultra vires and natural justice to agency decisions,
and interpreting the range of applicability of the adjudicative model very
narrowly-especially its more formal variations. 98
04 Much of the relevant case law, including the landmark Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), is discussed in McGarity, supra note 82.
95 See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., supra note 94.
96 See, e.g., Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 140. The Cabinet has
used its authority under the Act to exempt a number of public projects from the requirement of holding environmental impact hearings; see Makin, "Environment Act weakened
by exemptions, group says," The Globe and Mail (Toronto), June 2, 1981.
07 McGarity, supra note 82, at 776n. 237.
98 Gilinas, Judicial Control of Administrative Action: Great Britain and Canada
(1963), 140 Pub. L. 155; Dussault, Relationship Between the Nature of the Acts of the

Administration and Judicial Review: Quebec and Canada (1967),

10 Can. Pub. Ad.

298; Kersell, Statutory and Judicial Control of Administrative Behaviour (1976),
Can. Pub. Ad. 295 at 297-302.
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There have been a number of recent proposals for the imposition of procedural requirements upon cabinet decision-making in regulatory matters. At
the federal level, an administrative directive of the Treasury Board99 instructs
departments and agencies subject to Treasury Board review to follow certain
notice and comment procedures in the preparation of "major" regulations involving matters of health, safety, and fairness. For the most past, these proposals and reforms are derived more from a "consultative" model of the structure of relationships between decision-makers and affected interests than from
an adjudicative model, and shall be discussed more fully in that context
below.10o
Although the procedural fairness of the Canadian standard-setting process regarding health hazards is clearly in need of vast improvement, it is important that reform efforts not be modelled too closely on adjudicatory procedures. The adjudicative model has, in theory, undeniable advantages. It guarantees affected parties or their representatives face to face access to decisionmakers and often to opposing parties. More than any other model, its dynamics demand that the factual basis of decisions be carefully scrutinized from
both adversarial and "impartial" viewpoints. And it requires that decisions be
legitimated by overarching principles of "right" and "wrong" and not simply
reflect the balance of power in the health hazard arena.
The disadvantages of adjudication, however, are also considerable. It exacerbates conflict, structuring relationships on an adversarial basis and creating
clear winners and losers in each case, and enhances the likelihood that the
loser will seek to delay implementation of the decision through further appeal
or other tactics of obstruction. To a greater extent than the bargaining model,
but less than the managerial discretion model, it further alienates both winners
and losers from the decision-making process by making them aware of their
loss of freedom to an institution of the state. It distorts information, not only
by encouraging adversarial presentations of facts and preferences, but also by
requiring those presentations to meet certain rules of evidence; and it leaves
decision-making authority with an arbiter whose "feel" for the issues at hand is
likely to be less sensitive than that of the parties. To a greater extent than any
other model, it increases the likelihood that parties will advance relatively
inflexible claims of right or accusations of guilt. Indeed, as Fuller has noted,
such a mode of presentation of the issues is virtually demanded by the institutional framework within which litigants and adjudicators function.' 0 '
Finally, adjudication appeals to precedent in what has been called the
"gradual tracing out of the full implications of a system already established,' 0 2
and it ill suited to finding innovative solutions to conflicts between interests
that have not been resolved even in general terms through a contract or
through an accommodation of interests at the legislative level.

99

Can., Treasury Board, Administrative Policy Manual (Ottawa: n. pub., 1979)

ch. 9.

100See text accompanying notes 110-12, infra.

2o Supra note 49, at 369.
102 Fuller, supra note 49, at 377.
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These shortcomings may well be outweighed by the power of the adjudicatory process to clear through adversarial presentations to a core of established fact, and to maintain the role of principle, as opposed to power balance,
in the operation of the state. But it is likely to do so only to the extent that
the issues do indeed revolve around a firm core of established fact, implicate
principles of "right" and "wrong", and affect a range of interests that is capable of being captured in a single dispute. In the health hazard arena, these
conditions do not prevail. Pervasive complexities and uncertainties, particularly in the scientific field, limit the applicability of the adjudicative model. In
the first place, the adjudicative process is unsuited for the resolution of transscientific issues. Scientific evidence is treated in this model as factual evidence
-but as we have seen, the degree of certainty with which scientific facts can
be stated in the health hazard arena is relatively low. Extrapolation from
limited data, the construction of research designs and test methodologies, and
the construction of interpretative models all involve the exercise of scientific
judgment. Careful examination and cross-examination of expert witnesses may
be useful in order to identify the assumptions underlying different scientific
models and the different interpretations of and inferences from existing data.
But as McGarity has noted in a review of OSHA experience with the adjudicative model, the "administrative and judicial review process ... can test these
assumptions.. . only to the extent that a lay person's understanding is an
appropriate litmus. 10 3 To require that administrators and courts follow an
adjudicative model in decision-making about health hazards tends to demand
that decisions be based on scientific evidence whereas the level of uncertainty
requires that they be based on policy. In other words, whereas bargaining
risks treating scientific issues as trans-scientific, adjudication risks treating
trans-scientific issues as scientific.
The applicability of an adjudicatory model to standard-setting regarding
health hazards is limited not only by the uncertainties associated with the
issues involved but by their complexity. Building upon Fuller's analysis, Eisenberg has argued that the "norm of strong responsiveness" inherent in the adjudicative model (that is, its requirement that the judge's decisions proceed
from the arguments, and only from the arguments advanced by the parties
appearing before him) makes it ill suited for the resolution of "polycentric"
problems. 10 4 Polycentric problems are those involving complex interactions
among a large number of interests, such that different solutions may implicate
different sets of interests (or, put another way, different solutions may change
the parameters of the problem). Fuller analogized the polycentric problem to
a spider web; "it is 'many centred'-each crossing of strands is a distinct
centre for distributing tensions."' 0 5 To essentially limit the focus of decisionmaking (through the norm of strong responsiveness) to two opposing interests in a given dispute-in Fuller's analogy, to a single "crossing of strands"
-ignores the overall structure of the problem; the complex web of interactions.
Polycentricity is a matter of degree, and the scope of adjudication would
1o3

Supra note 82, at 747.

104 Supra note

88.

105 Fuller, supranote 49, at 395.
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be narrowly defined indeed if all polycentric tasks were placed beyond its pale.
Nonetheless, problems of health hazards are polycentric to a very high degree:
they involve complex interactions due not only to political and economic interdependencies but also to the operation of biological and ecological systems. In
this context the following critique of adjudicative procedures is particularly
relevant:
Polycentric problems can be solved only by taking account of numerous interdependent and highly variable factors which oblige the decision-maker to manage
a kind of cybernetic process involving tentative probe, feedback, adjustment, and
reconciliation ... .Such a problem (for example, the selection of a water quality
standard) requires the exercise of substantial discretion rather than the application
of pre-existing decision rules, and its solution will often require interaction between the decision maker and others--interaction that would be inconsistent with
traditional norms of litigation. 106

It is conceivable that certain polycentric problems could be solved through
the exercise of managerial authority aided by systems analysis, or through a
process of bargaining which represented all affected interests. 10 7 But each of
these models suffers from the limitations and biases suggested earlier, affecting
the weighting of interests and the processing of information. There remains to
be considered a hybrid model, that of consultation.
D.

Consultation
The consultation model combines elements of each of the models discussed so far. Like the adjudication model, it assures affected interests of the
opportunity to present arguments, though not necessarily face to face, to the
decision-maker in authority, and obliges decision-makers to attend to those
arguments and to respond to them in explaining their decision. Like the model
of managerial discretion, it leaves the decision-maker free to gather his own
evidence and to base his decision on considerations not adduced by any party.
As with both managerial discretion and bargaining, it admits the relevance of
a wide range of evidence of varying degrees of certainty. And although it does
not explicitly encourage bargaining among affected interests, it does at least
free, and indeed encourage, decision-makers to enter into negotiation with
affected interests, thereby expanding the range of options considered and
encouraging innovative solutions.
The consultation process may, in practice, take a number of institutional
forms of various degrees of openness. At one extreme, it may entail only the
striking of advisory committees representative of a range of affected interests,
whose reports may or may not be made public. In the mid-range are minimum
notice and comment procedures such as those governing the promulgation of
regulations relating to designated hazardous substances under Ontario's Occupational Health and Safety Act, 0 8 which requires that the Minister of Labour:
(a) Shall publish in the Ontario Gazette a notice stating that the substance may
be designated and calling for briefs or submissions in relation to the designation; and
10 Schuck, supranote 73, at 29.
1o7 Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951).

108 R.S.O. 1980, c. 321, s. 22.
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(b) Shall publish in the Ontario Gazette a notice setting forth the proposed regulation relating to the designation of the substance at least 60 days before the
regulation is filed with the Registrar of Regulations.

Access to submissions by affected parties may be more or less restrained
under such provisions-in the Ontario case it is granted at the discretion of
the Minister. Somewhat more open and interactive procedures are typical under the notice and comment provisions of the AdministrativeProcedureAct' 00
in the United States, noted earlier, which explicitly admit of the possibility of
oral testimony and which place some obligation on decision-makers to explain
their actions.' O Even more explicit in its requirements for explanation (though
less firm in its authoritative base) is the Socio-economic Impact Analysis (SEIA)
programme of the federal Treasury Board in Canada. Under this programme,
the Treasury Board has instructed all departments and agencies under its purview (including all those engaged in health and safety regulations) to publish in
draft form all "major" regulations touching upon matters of health, safety, and
fairness; to accompany the publication with a socio-economic impact analysis
assessing the cost and benefit of "all technological and policy-instrument alternatives considered," to allow 60 days for public comment upon the proposed
regulation and the accompanying SEIA; and to reply to those comments.1 '
Most extensive in terms of their requirements of explanation are the provisions of President Reagan's recent Executive Order that requires regulatory
impact analyses to accompany both notices of intent and drafts of "major"
2

rules.11

It is worthwhile to take a general evaluative look at the basic elements
of the consultation model: assured participation for a range of affected interests, interaction between decision-makers and affected interests on the basis
of reasoned argument, and ultimate administrative discretion." 83 As a hybrid,
the consultation model exhibits some of the shortcomings as well as the
strengths of the models discussed so far. In the first place, like bargaining
and adjudication, it may delay decision-making." i 4 The procedures themselves,
109 5 U.S.C.S. §§ 551 et seq., 701 et seq. (1980).

110 Section 553 of the Act provides for, but does not require, oral submissions, and
requires the publication of proposed regulations to be accompanied by a brief statement

of their basic purpose.
" Supranote 99.
112 Executive Order 12291, issued on Feb. 17, 1981, 46 F.R. 13193. Both the SEIA
programme and the American programme define "major" rules as those whose estimated
costs exceed a specified economic threshold, although in the United States, the Office
of Management and Budget may designate any rule as "major'.

IM This model is traced out in Eisenberg, supra note 88.
114 Canadian experience with the federal SEIA programme and the Ontario Occupational Health and Safety Act requirements, for example, suggests that the time required
to promulgate regulations through these consultative processes may be a year or more
rather than the few months implied in the 60-day minimum period for comment. Some
of this delay is attributable, no doubt, to the newness and unfamiliarity of these processes. In the federal programme, delay was compounded in one case when one of the
parties invoked a public hearings provision of a relevant statute. See Anderson, "The
Federal Regulation-Making Process and Regulatory Reform, 1969-1979," in Stanbury,

ed., Government Regulation: Scope, Growth, and Process (Montreal: Inst. for Res. on
Pub. Pol'y, 1980).
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however, are less time consuming and less subject to manipulation than are
those, such as cross-examination and judicial review of the record imposed
by the adjudication model. And the fact that ultimate discretion remains with
the administrative decision-maker reduces the pressure that an interest group
can bring to bear by delaying indefinitely, as is possible in a pure bargaining
process.
Like each of the other models, moreover, the consultation process is susceptible to limitations and distortions in the flow of information, but the problems are least acute in this case. The tolerance of uncertainy is greater in a
consultation process than it is under an adjudication model with the latter's
template of "facts" and "law". The biases of adversarial sources of information that characterize the bargaining and adjudication models remain problematic here, but at least the consultation process leaves the administrative
decision-maker free to develop information and analysis independently.' 5
Furthermore, while leaving the decision-maker free to garner his own information, a consultation process does not leave him dependent on his own resources or on his own judgment in identifying relevant information and sources
of information. By guaranteeing a wide range of interests access to the centre
of decision-making, consultation procedures potentially uncover information
that might be ignored under a model of pure managerial discretion.
The feasibility of consultation and the realization of its potential advantages depend on the particular institutional devices adopted, their degree
of formality, their phasing and their scope. There are some general criteria to
be considered in these respects. The logic of the model demands that consultation procedures be sufficiently institutionalized that the access of affected interests to the centre of decision-making, at least in terms of an exchange of
arguments on paper, is not dependent upon the discretion of the decisionmaker. It demands that the process be phased to allow affected interests early
and periodic notice of the progression of the decision-maker's thinking about
the issues, so that the parties may prepare relevant responses. But notice
should not be so early or so frequent that groups become overloaded in responding to matters irrelevant to the ultimate course of decision-making, and
hence become alienated from the process." 6 Institutionally established deadlines for response should not be immutable, but should be available to be
invoked to thwart strategies of delay on the part of particular interests. Finally,
to avoid the deliberate or unintentional overloading of the process, there
should be some mechanism for exempting routine or insignificant matters from
its requirements.
Against these general criteria it is possible to assess a number of versions
115 In practice, of course, it is often the case that adversarial interests remain the

only source of certain crucial information such as past exposure levels and medical
histories-in which case only a trial-type adjudicative process with powers to compel
the production of documents and records could free such information. Given the scientific uncertainties surrounding the interpretation of such data, however, it is unlikely
that the benefits of access to them would outweigh the loss of flexibility in the exercise
of policy judgment by going the adjudicative route.
16 Econ. Coun. of Can., supra note 33, at 74.
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of consultative structures and processes. Let us consider first the use of advisory committees representative of a range of affected interests.
Although the logic and effectiveness of the consultation model require
that advisory committees have some legislative base and not be struck entirely
at the discretion of the administrative decision-maker, the actual structure of
the committee may exhibit varying degrees of permanence and formality. The
enabling statute might, for example, require the administrative standard-setter
to strike and to disband advisory committees on a serial basis as particular
hazards are considered. "1 7 Although this approach provides for a recruiting
of representatives with expertise and interests specific to a given hazard, these
advantages are likely to be outweighed by those of a permanent advisory committee. A number of trans-scientific issues recur as particular hazards are
considered, and there is much to be gained from a continuing panel whose
members do not have to resolve these issues anew in each instance. Furthermore, a perianent committee can be provided with a research and analysis
capability-a capability essential to the effectiveness of the consultation procedure. Given the extent of the politicization of the scientific debate surrounding health hazards, and the varying resources of affected interests, it is likely
that the only credible research and analytic enterprise is one conducted under
the aegis of a body representing various contending groups in a specific jurisdictional context.
In this respect, both British and American experience can be instructive.
The British Health and Safety Commission," s whose membership comprises
representatives of labour, business, consumer associations, and local authorities, as well as scientific and medical experts, provides an ongoing forum for
the scientific evaluation of health hazards, such as that recently undertaken by
its Advisory Committee on Asbestos. Such a broadly representative group
would appear, both in theory and in the light of experience, to be more credible to a wide range of affected interests than are agencies more closely identified with government itself, which may be seen as more vulnerable to shifting
political pressures. In the United States, for example, the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health 1 9 has at various times been perceived as
allied with industrial or with labour interests. 120
The research and analysis overseen by an advisory committee need not
117 The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 651 et seq.
(1982), at the federal level in the United States, provides for, but does not require,
the appointment of such ad hoc committees at the stage of drafting proposed OSHA
rules. Such committees are frequently appointed and are required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, § 10, 5 U.S.C.S., App. I § 10 (1980), to open their meetings
to the public and to make accurate transcripts and minutes of any hearings (see Kelman,
supra note 29, at 244-45). This degree of publicity would seem to mitigate the advantages of flexibility and frankness to be gained from face-to-face contact among affected
interests.
118 This Commission is constituted under the Health and Safety at Work Etc. Act,
1974, c. 37 (U.K.).
119 Created by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, §22, 29 U.S.C.S.
§671 (1982).
12 0 See Epstein, supra note 9, at 352-54.
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be conducted entirely in-house; indeed, the most effective use of available
facilities and expertise is likely to entail the committee's functioning as a funding agency for external research. This approach is, of course, not without its
pitfalls as recent revelations of fraudulant testing of pesticides by the private
Industrial Biotest Laboratories under contract to the government of the United
States have indicated, 121 and the committee should possess sufficient in-house
research and analytic capability to give close scrutiny to contract and grant
research.
The credibility and effectiveness of an advisory committee depends essentially on the manner of its composition: upon the range of interests represented and on the relationship between the representatives and their respective
constituencies. The range of interests is particularly problematic in the hazard arena, with its pervasive externalities and concommitant difficulties of representing diffuse third party interests. Furthermore, as the Economic Council
of Canada noted in its Interim Report on its Regulation Reference, there is
usually "a set of obvious candidates" for participation in the consultative process, a phenomenon that carries the danger that governments will fall into "the
convenient habit of consulting only with "established groups". 2 2 There is no
effective way of avoiding this danger through a legislative stipulation of committee membership while still preserving the flexibility that is the major advantage of a consultation process. But the problem is less acute if the advisory
committee approach is complemented by notice and comment procedures, assuring access for and attention to a much wider range of interests.
A further point regarding the committee's composition-that is, the
formal relationship between committee members and the interests they represent-needs to be made. Recent thories of public accountability, shaped by a
pluralist approach to the understanding of politics, have argued strongly that
"one is accountable to agents who control scarce resources one desires" and
that the accountability of a representative to his constituency is only as great
as the sanctions that can be exercised against him by the constituency. 123 Applying this argument to the case of the representation of affected interests in
the regulatory process, some commentators have argued that, to be effectively
accountable to their respective constituencies, representatives must be specifically nominated by organized groups within those constituencies,
who then
124
hold the sanction of renewing or rescinding the nomination.
Some reservations about this prescription have been expressed elsewhere. 12 5 Apart from the fact that it favours the organized over the unor121 Keating, "Safety tests faked, but 79 pesticides left on market", The Globe and
Mail (Toronto), April 27, 1981 at 1.
22

1

Supranote 33, at 74-75.

123 See, e.g., Morone and Marmor, Representing Consumer Interests: The Case of
American Health Planning (1981), 91 Ethics 431.
124

Id. at 435.

125 Tuohy, "Public Accountability of Professional Groups: The Case of the Legal

Profession in Ontario," in Trebilcock and Evans, eds., Lmvyers and the Consumer
Interest (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); "The Struggle for Professional Power", Policy
Options, March/April, 1981.
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ganized segments of particular constituencies, it can lead to the taking of
inflexible positions by participants. This results not only from a desire on the
part of delegates to be able to present themselves to their constituents as vigorous defenders of constituency interests, but also from the logic and strategy
of bargaining through agents. Schelling's point about the bargaining power to
be gained from establishing a credible commitment to a particular position is
relevant in this context.126 He argues that such a commitment can be made
credible where a delegate can assert that he is bound to carry out his mandate or lose his position with his parent organization, and that gaining approval for such a change in position would entail a process too lengthy to be
accommodated in the timetable of the negotiating process. To reduce the
significance of these tactics and incentives, it is preferable that representatives
be drawn from identifiable constituencies of interest but not nominated or appointed by specific organizations. A statutory clause such as that contained in
Ontario's OccupationalHealth and Safety Act 127 regarding the composition of
the Advisory Council on Occupational Health and Occupational Safety, established therein, strikes an appropriate balance between assured access for
relevant constituencies and freedom of action for both administrative decisionmakers and constituency representatives. That statute provides that the Council's twelve to twenty members
shall be appointed for such term as the Lieutenant Governor in Council determines and shall be representative of management, labour, and technical or prowith and have knowledge of
fessional persons and the public who are concerned
12 8
occupational health and occupational safety.

Great care must be taken in the selection of members of such a committee.
It is, after all, the only forum in which affected interests will be guaranteed
the important resource of face to face access to the centre of decision-making.
Even so, standing alone, these provisions for a representative advisory committee are insufficiently comprehensive in the range of interests to whom access is assured, and offer insufficient checks on the "convenient habit" or
cognitive routine of consulting only conventional sources of information. Advisory committees need to inform and to be informed by a broader scan of
interests and information through notice and comment procedurps. Through
such procedures, constituencies unrepresented on the advisory committee, or
segments of constituencies who disagree with the position taken by their representative on the committee, are assured an opportunity to gain the attention of decision-makers.
The institutional basis of these notice and comment procedures should
comprise a set of statutory provisions. Enabling legislation should require an
administrative decision-maker, having tentatively determined in consultation
with an advisory committee to set or modify a standard regarding control of a
health hazard, to publish a notice of such intent and to allow a comment
period of specified length to be accorded for the receipt of written submissions.
126 Schelling, supranote 83, at 29.
127 R.S.O. 1980, c. 321.
128 Id., s. 10(2).
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After this period, another provision should require the publication of any proposed standard and the according of a second comment period before the
standard becomes effective. As to the content of these notices, the enabling
legislation should require that the initial notice of intent be accompanied by a
statement of the general lines of argument and evidence upon which the decision was based; and that the publication of the proposed standard itself be
accompanied by a general outline of the arguments and evidence supporting
that particular standard.
It is important that these requirements for explanation not be overly
ambitious. In light of the limitations and biases of cost-benefit and costeffectiveness analysis outlined above, the requirements of the federal SEIA
programme provide an example of what is to be avoided in statutory prescriptions. The Treasury Board directive requires the presentation of cost-benefit
data for all feasible alternatives considered in the development of the regulation in question. 129 As noted earlier, 130 it is difficult in standard-setting procedures to avoid the deadlocks resulting from partisan cost-benefit analyses with
their highly manipulable assumptions, but it is not necessary to invite such
problems. Nor is it practical to invite delay by requiring a given set of decisionmakers to manufacture a wide range of options to meet paper requirements.
Innovation is more likely to arise from diversified sources of information and
analysis than from paper requirements to "identify alternatives". In a similar
vein it is worth noting that SEIA-type requirements tend to defeat one of the
major purposes of notice and comment procedures-that is, to ensure that
relevant interests and evidence are not overlooked-by channeling the consultation process into areas accessible largely to those "cerebral prestidigitators" capable of manipulating the techniques of cost-benefit analysis. The results, moreover, are likely to be ultimately unpersuasive and unhelpful to
decision-makers increasingly skeptical of such manipulations.
While not requiring an elaborate setting out of evidence and analysis, the
statute ought nonetheless to guarantee access for all parties to the various
partisan analyses and submissions-including those of the advisory committee
-generated by the process. If a genuine joining of issues appears to be
emerging as interest groups attempt to rebut each other's submissions, it may
be necessary to extend one or other of the comment periods, or even to bring
the groups face to face in an informal hearing; but such options should be left
to the discretion of the decision-maker lest they become routinely exploited in
the bargaining strategies of particular groups.
The resource implications of these provisions, and their demands on the
patience of the participants, require that some limit be placed on the range of
standard-setting instruments to which they pertain. It is tempting to limit their
application to a particular class of instrument defined by its legal status (such
as regulations); but to do so would provide a clear incentive for administrators
wishing to circumvent the process to use an exempt instrument such as a
129 Can., Treasury Board, supra note 99, discussed in Econ. Coun. of Can., supra
note 33, at 113n. 17.
130See text accompanying notes 69-70, supra.
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guideline or3 directive that may have a similar effect though it involves different
sanctions.1 1
If the standard-setting process is to be subject to consultation requirements regardless of the instrument used, it is particularly important that there
be some mechanism of exempting relatively insignificant changes in policy
from the full consultation process. The federal SEIA programme establishes an
economic threshold; only those regulations whose estimated social costs exceed specified levels are subject to its provisions. 132 This economic threshold
approach suffers from the same problems of cost estimation noted earlier, a3
however, and provides an incentive for those who would circumvent the consultative process to underestimate costs. On the other hand, exemption at the
discretion of the administrative decision-maker undermines the integrity of
the consultation process. The most reasonable intermediate course would
seem to be to have exemptions from the process routinely reviewed and approved by the advisory committee.
One final point remains to be addressed: the question whether regulatory
standards ought to be set within government departments13 4and hence under
the direct authority of Cabinet, or by independent agencies.
One of the major principles traditionally advanced in favour of locating
a function in an independent agency is the necessity of removing quasi-judicial
functions, that is, the application of general rules to individuals according to
their particular circumstances, from the governmental policy-making process
itself. Despite the fact that exposure standards may have retrospective effects
on a few concentrated interests, however, it is difficult to construe their development as a quasi-judicial function. The other reason most commonly advanced for placing a function in an independent agency is the need to structure a balance of interests in the decision-making process different from that
which prevails in the general ministerial-Cabinet-legislative process. But in
practice, given conventions of ministerial responsibility and Cabinet collegiality, it is impossible to isolate a contentious and politicized issue such as health
hazards from the general political process. In such a context, the standardsetter's obligation and ability to receive public advice from a representative
advisory committee and to follow notice and comment procedures is more
important than where he sits in the administrative apparatus.
One related point should be raised in this context, however. The question
of the appropriate institutional level at which standard-setting processes should
be established-federal, provincial, regional, industrial, firm-is one that requires much fuller attention than can be given within the scope of this paper.
Again the choice of appropriate response requires a balancing of analytic and
cybernetic considerations. An analytic approach would look for economies of
131 On a similar point, see Econ. Coun. of Can., supra note 33, at 112n. 15, and
Standing Joint Committee on Regulations and Other Statutory Instruments, Second
Report (Ottawa: Min. of Supply and Services, 1977) at 84.
132 See note 112, supra.
13 3 See discussion under "Decision Rules", supra.
134 See Doern, supra note 41, at 25-27; Econ. Coun. of Can., supra note 33, at 64
et seq.
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scale in information processing and, other things being equal, would tend to
favour a more centralized response than would a cybernetic approach. The
latter, with its emphasis on incremental change within an established response
repertoire, would argue for an exploitation of the learning potential of diversity in the repertoires at different institutional levels. The cybernetic concern
with the shaping of preferences of affected interests in concrete situations
would reinforce an argument for a more decentralized approach. But the relevance of each of these approaches can best be judged in particular situations,
taking into account the diversity and variation in the factors bearing on health
risk and risk reduction, and the analytic and cybernetic capacities of the relevant institutions.13 5
VI. CONCLUSION
Science is at present incapable of providing unambiguous assessments of
the magnitude of risk from a variety of occupational health hazards. The complex inter-relationships of the factors involved, and the scientific uncertainties
as to their effects, place great strains upon the analytic capabilities of policymaking systems. These strains are compounded by uncertainties about social
and individual preferences, and by the unequal distribution of political and
economic resources that facilitate the expression of preferences.
As a result, highly analytic aids to policy-making, such as cost-benefit
analysis and adjudicatory procedures, have a useful but limited contribution
to make in this arena. Carefully employed, they can be useful in clarifying the
assumptions that underlie various proposals. But, especially in the absence of
firm scientific data, they are highly manipulable. Furthermore, because they
are costly and time consuming, and because they favour action whose positive
net benefit can be factually demonstrated, their general effect in the occupational health hazard arena is to bias outcomes in favour of industrial interests
or at least of the status quo. Finally, because of their manipulability and bias,
they lead to skepticism about, and alienation from, the policy process.
These analytic techniques are best employed as adjuncts to an essentially
deliberative and participatory process. Amorphous preferences are likely to
take shape, and learning about complex issues to occur, in the interactive process of generating, opposing, defending, reviewing, and modifying concrete
options.
This emphasis upon essentially cybernetic mechanisms needs to be qualified in at least two respects. First, it should not be taken to imply that analysis
cannot play a larger role in Canadian standard-setting processes than it has in
the past. Indeed, the encouragement of partisan analysis through notice and
comment procedures, and the role of advisory committees in overseeing and
funding research and analysis, with the implied governmental budgetary commitment, are central to the consultation model proposed here. Finally, we
cannot lose sight of the inevitable limitations of both analysis and cybernetics,
and the irreducible core of judgment upon which all public policy decisions
ultimately turn.
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See Tuohy and Trebilcock, supra note 14, at ch. 9.

